



TAKING CONTROL OF THE DEBATE:
LIBERAL POLICIES
AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES
OF MIGRATION IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE



Budapest, 2016

Taking control of the debate: liberal policies and communication strategies of migration in Central and Eastern Europe

Edited by Csaba Tóth

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Published by the European Liberal Forum with the support of Republikon Foundation for Science, Education and Research. Funded by the European Parliament. Neither the European Parliament, nor the European Liberal Forum is responsible for the content of the publication. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the view of the European Parliament or the European Liberal Forum. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the permission of the European Liberal Forum



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Republikon Institute
Budapest 2016



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FOREWORD

Migration will be a more and more challenging social issue in Europe for the foreseeable future. Due to this, right-wing populist parties and politicians will continue to exploit the topic for their own benefit, which imposes a permanent threat to liberal democracies. Alongside of the topic of migration, populist right-wing parties try to redefine European values and aim to have an impact on citizens' attitudes by raising social intolerance. In Central and Eastern Europe due to lower living standards and the intra-European migration towards Western member states, citizens are less tolerant with immigrants regardless of their much lower proportion. Moreover, in the CEE countries, there are fewer experiences on dealing with immigrants. Despite of these structural factors the answer to the migration challenge cannot be the full isolation. Liberal political forces should not accept these attitudes as given and constant. In order to advocate liberal values and promote liberal policies, liberal political parties should take control of the migration debate. It is important to emphasize the historical achievement of liberal values in keeping peace and stability in Europe. Liberal policies of migration should also take into account economic aspects. The CEE countries' interests are to let educated, skilled people with a high potential to social and cultural integration into their job markets.

Migrants in Western Europe had a huge contribution to the economic development. While it is important to discuss the difficulties of integration in the case of the second and third generations of migrants in Europe, the merits of their parents should be also acknowledged. Thus, migration should not be regarded as a threat, but as an opportunity. Nevertheless, it is important to have control over migration. Hungary and other CEE countries have the advantage to utilize the experiences of Western countries in migration policies and

social integration. However, it is also the matter of political will and not just expertise. The Hungarian government for instance not just responded to the migration pressure with law and order rhetoric and measures, but also deliberately let to escalate the refugee crisis in order to gain back their lost electoral support. As the refugee crisis was unexpected and due to the government's communication, the whole phenomena appeared as an issue of national security and cultural threat. Such instrumentalization is of course does not take into account the long term consequences and the missed short term opportunities. However, liberal political forces should not only rely on statistical data and the inherent good faith of liberalism. Real actions should be taken in order to take control of the debate and not to let radical populists to exploit uncertainties and anxieties in the society. For this sake, liberal policies have to achieve two, sometimes contradictory goals. First, the liberal values, the protection of human rights and dignity should be consequently represented in migration and refugee policies. Secondly, liberal parties should preserve their agency, their capability to act in the given political context. Sticking to liberal values does not mean to move apart from citizen's legitimate demands to abstract moralizing.

In this volume we wish to contribute to ease the tension between those above-mentioned two imperatives of liberal policymaking on the field of migration and asylum. In order to achieve it, the volume reviews liberal policy making, consequences of the refugee crisis in electoral politics and various integration models. In the first chapter Marek Bertram compares the reactions of liberal parliamentary parties in Europe to the refugee crisis. The European liberal parties gave different responses to this challenge. It was a deciding factor if the given party was in the government, if the home country was a primary target of migration and if the home country lied on a main migration route. In his contribution Géza Tokár analyses the effects of the refugee crisis on the

2016 Slovak parliamentary elections. The bad results of the governing Smer party proved, that the migration issue alone is not sufficient for electoral success. Immigration implies the need of social integration of the newcomers. As Sándor Szabó points out economic and cultural aspects should be taken into account in this matter. Finally, Andrea Virág and Dániel Mikecz, researchers of Republikon Institute presents a detailed analysis of the 2016 Hungarian referendum on the EU refugee relocation quota.

I. IMMIGRATION POLICY OF EUROPEAN LIBERAL PARTIES

Bertram Marek

Introduction

Europe is facing the largest refugee crisis since World War II, resulting in a tectonic shift for the decision makers, not only on a national, but also on an EU-level. The crisis peaked in 2015, as according to Frontex data more than 1.8 million refugees (six times the number in 2014) arrived in Europe, hoping to start a new life. In this research paper, the immigration policies of ALDE and 13 countries (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden, United Kingdom) will be analysed, and the answer each gave in response to the collective European problem assessed. To wrap up, conclusions will be drawn and there will be an emphasis on outlining the similarities and differences. The analysed countries' parties – in addition to the point on the scale of political identity – have a common parameter that each can participate in the decision-making, thus obtained at least one mandate of the current parliament. The only exception, German FDP must be included in this research paper because the vast majority of immigrants went to Germany and they formed a relevant party again because of their proposals. In this report, not only the traditionally targeted countries' but also the Eastern European countries' immigration policy of liberal parties will be analysed which can make visible the contrast of the susceptibility toward the subject.

Austria

In September 2015 Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Austrian People's Party (VPÖ), together forming a coalition government, have agreed to receive migrants crossing Hungary. In a press release made by the Home Office, it is stated that in the eyes of the Austrian Authorities, the most important thing is to prevent human tragedies. However, later they were forced to make amendments to their immigration policy, for instance by installing security checkpoints on the Austro-Hungarian border. Last year, 90,000 migrants have applied for a refugee status in Austria and as result of this high number, the government has declared that due to the country's sustainability, only 37,500 migrants are to be received in 2016.

In May of this year, a law was passed allowing for a state of emergency to be called if too many refugees try to enter the country. The emergency status can be extended up to three separate six month periods, depending on the seriousness and threatening nature of the crisis. Earlier, the government has offered 500 Euros per person to Afghani, Moroccan, Iraqi and Nigerian refugees in exchange for returning home voluntarily. However, a mere 3,100 refugees seized the opportunity, implying that cash bonus has failed to motivate immigrants to leave Austria. It was under such circumstances that Neos was required to put forward suggestions regarding the immigration crisis.

Neos structures their proposals regarding the real immigration policy into different levels of action¹. The first is the personal level. It deals with what the individual can do to contribute to the solving of the immigration problem. Neo suggests writing a letter or email to the major, using the #aufstehn hashtag on social media or collect signatures for Wilkommenskultur's peti-

1 <https://parlament.neos.eu/asyl/>

tion. Furthermore, the #wilkommesnpaket charity is happy to receive any help, be it financial or material.

This is followed by a list of what the Neos is currently doing to stir the asylum procedure in a positive and effective direction. They have chosen what they think are the most efficient ways of aiding the process from the very beginning. Neos holds fundraising and helps the work of charities and presidents and vice presidents aid the work of the authorities on site. They are not asking much of the EU- only solidarity and humanism. Neos believes that the immigration crisis is a colossal challenge that the EU needs to solve together and in collaboration, as urgently as possible. In Neos' point of view, welcoming and helping asylum seekers is a humanitarian duty that can easily be executed despite it being seemingly difficult and controversial. On a national level, chaos needs to be controlled, for instance by dismantling the temporary refugee tents. The party also proposes the improvement of the asylum procedure itself, through hiring interpreters and legal advisers, as well as by providing healthcare. The government needs to take responsibility for ensuring the entry of refugees onto the labour market after six months of their arrival. Moreover, migrants, especially children should be aided in their education, and foreign certificates and degrees should be recognized.

On an EU-level, Neos called for the abolishment of the Dublin Regulation and proposes the establishment of a single European Asylum Procedure which will also be in charge of determining the quotas for each member state. Any state that does not accept their quota will be required to pay a penalty fee to the EU. Neos furthermore, proposes the organization of collective asylum centers on an EU-level, alongside the establishment of a European Asylum Support Office.

Lastly, on a regional crisis-level, Neos believes in permitting refugees to request asylum at embassies through Protected Entry Procedures. Furthermore, the party wishes to see Austria taking part in the UNHCR resettlement program. Finally, Neos calls for a joint foreign and security policy within the EU.

Belgium

The ruling liberal party, Mouvement Réformateur (MR) puts a lot of emphasis on their immigration policy in their program. Their main goal is to create and achieve a humane but strict immigration policy in Belgium.² They see it necessary to propose new policies to correlate migration and needs of the labour market in Belgium.

The 2007 “Home Law” asks for the reception parameters of asylum seekers in Belgium. The home is characterized by an exclusively material assistance rather than financial assistance administered by the Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (Fedasil) and applications are examined case by case. Under this term, the asylum procedure has been further improved to be faster, six months on average to process a case against 13 months previously. In 2015, Belgium has hosted 39,000 asylum seekers which is twice as many as in 2014. The MR proposed placing management of asylum and immigration policy in the hands of one Minister (reception, asylum, stay and return policy) alongside other propositions and achievements in this area.

Furthermore, a safe country of origin list has been created: the list shows the countries where there is no question of persecution under the Geneva Convention or risk of serious injury upon return to the native country. The pro-

2 http://www.mr.be/sites/default/files/Programme_ge_ne_ral_-_25_mai_2014.pdf

cedure related to countries on this list is faster. Applications can be examined within 15 days and thus decongest the reception centres.

It must be noted that aid is exclusively given in the form of material assistance rather than financial assistance: reception in Belgium is done exclusively on a material basis and not financial.

A law concerning fight against human trafficking was passed on March 4, 2013 and helps fight against illegal immigration. This details sanctions and measures against employers of illegal immigrants according to a joint liability system. Belgian law already provided for criminal sanctions against employers who employ third-country nationals staying illegally. This change in the law, however, requires the employer to explicitly check if the worker has a valid residence permit before hiring them.

For years, Belgium has had the reputation of being a lax state, a 'paradise for illegal migrants' as worded by the MR. The party very clearly states that this situation must stop. Since 2 July 2012, third-country nationals who receive an order to leave the territory may also be notified of an entry ban. In 2012, 11,386 people were repatriated against 10 313 in 2011 and only 8,537 in 2010. 42% of legal immigration in Belgium is family immigration through family reunification while the European average is only 29%. This new law, on the initiative of MR, restricted the beneficiaries of family reunification to the nuclear family in order to ensure that the applicant's reunification can accommodate candidates in Belgium in decent housing. An applicant must spend at least one year of legal residence in Belgium before they can submit a request to bring their partner. Since 2011, the law on family reunification has become stricter in Belgium. There are two main criteria: adequate resources (at least equal to 120% of the living wage) and adequate housing (meeting the require-

ments to be rented as a primary residence). Although refugees are exempt from the recognition of these requirements, Open VLD³ proposes the further evaluation of this, given the further inflow of refugees that are predicted.

The asylum procedure has been reformed to make it more efficient and faster, guaranteeing the rights of asylum seekers at the same time. The new amendments to the reception procedure are designed to handle cases in 6 months (13 months on average) to fight against multiple applications and promote voluntary returns. In the past, multiple applications presented a big problem and slowed down the application process considerably. A large number of new applications were declared adopts a strict, individual return policy. The Open Vld proposes the allocation of refugees recognized under the Geneva Convention to member states, and pushes for their freedom to move around the European Union according to the same rules as any EU national. Moreover, they called for international agreements between Turkey and the EU in order to make Turkey a safe country to immigrants and thus improve the asylum process. Belgium has taken steps to speed up this process by increasing the number of authority officials dealing with asylum cases. In December 2015, Belgium has changed the unlimited residence of recognized refugees to a temporary residence permit of five years. After five years, an unlimited permit can be granted, given that the refugee's status has not been changed (suspended or revoked). Open Vld states that since the conflicts in the countries of origin of most current refugees are not likely to be ended soon, more emphasis needs to be put on the integration of refugees to make their stay a success. They furthermore single out language and work as the main guidelines to a successful integration.

In Belgium, every refugee has the right to social integration, guaranteed by the Public Welfare Centre (OCMW). The OCMW has three main tools, which

3 https://mi.addemmar.com/files/a_nationaal/data/File/Nota-asiel-en-migratie.pdf

include employment (mediation in the search for work); wages to be able to make a living; the Individualized Project for Social Integration (GPMI). The GPMI considers expectations, skilled abilities on an individual level, and it is effectively a companion in education, training and work experience, which should lead to a decent job. The Open VLD calls for the expansion of the beneficiaries of the GPMI because they are committed to self-sufficiency and not dependency. Additionally, the party proposes helping fugitives with customized programs consisting of language tuition, education, training and work experience.

Open Vld is pushing for child refugees to go to school as soon as possible, as they firmly believe that every child should have the right to an education. Furthermore, the party would like to set up bridging programs where Belgians and refugees work together and integrate in a natural way. Additionally, Open Vld believes it is essential to make the labour market more attractive and welcoming towards refugees, to encourage them.

On the topic of economic migration, Open Vld reiterates its plea to allow economic migration within a European framework and joins the ALDE proposals (for instance the adoption of the Blue Card or the introduction of temporary work permits).

Finally, the party strongly believes that Europe needs to do more against the inhumane conditions faced by refugees in camps in the Syrian region. In March 2016, Belgium increased its humanitarian efforts by 30 million Euros following the proposal of Minister of Development Alexander De Croo. Although a small scale initiative, in general, the Open Vld believes that Humanitarian efforts and diplomatic measures must go hand in hand. Furthermore, in August 2016, the Belgian government has allocated 13,5 million Euros for

Internally Displaced Persons in Kurdistan, including victims of war in Iraq and Syrian refugees.

Refugee reception has not been executed smoothly, for instance there were not enough places in the integration training lessons. In January, in the whole of Brussels only one institution offered language tuition for 3000 refugees. Originally more such courses were planned, which should have been running as of December 2015.

Croatia

Croatian People's Party - Liberal Democrats (HNS) was a member of the ruling coalition until 2015. It was replaced by the Conservative Croatian Union (HDZ) with the support of Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán. During their campaign at a meeting, Orbán's letter was read out loud, in which he stated that Croatia is at the threshold of a historic election, since a massive tide of immigrants is threatening the country. Orbán went on to declare that it was necessary for HDZ to win the elections, as according to him, they were the only ones capable of dealing with the upcoming crisis. The then reigning Prime Minister said during the campaign that the Hungarian government's only intention with the building of the fence on the southern border of Hungary was to generate chaos, thus helping HDZ to their victory. HDZ accused the government of helplessness and highlighted Hungary's example as the only real solution. As a result of this, on July 30, Croatia put up a fence along their border with Serbia.

In May, Croatia began resettlement and relocation of refugees from Greece, Italy and directly from Syria. In total, Croatia will accept approximately 1,600 refugees over the course of the next two years. In the middle of July, the HDZ put forward a motion of no confidence due to being suspected of corrup-

tion, whereupon parliament was dissolved, followed by elections held on September 11, which resulted in both the left and the right electoral coalition obtaining 57-57 mandates, meaning it is very probable that the HDZ will be forming a coalition government once again. HNS' general immigration policy was presented by Vesna Pusić (former vice-president of HNS) on a panel discussion which was organized by HNS's political academy in January of 2013 – before the EU membership. As she said, their goal is to increase the protection of human rights along democratic standards. At the same time, they want a stricter migration policy and control of the asylum seekers.

According to HNS, Croatia's interest is to have more people because of sparse population, so immigration could lead to a successful economy. While Croatian liberals are supportive, they want to keep internal dangers and conflicts away because stability and security ensure successful integration into their society. Pusić said that Croatian society is ready and able to live in this changed situation - becoming a member of EU and fulfilled its conditions - and use that as a positive opportunity to open a decent life for all.

Czech Republic

The relatively newly formed and ALDE member Czech party, ANO 2011 earlier stated that migration and influx of immigrants into Europe is an opportunity and not a threat. Nowadays they – especially Andrej Babiš, finance minister and the leader of ANO - represent a completely different attitude. Last September, he argued that refugees from Syria and other countries should come to the Czech Republic to occupy thousands of long-term vacant jobs that local people are not interested in. Babiš also said after a meeting of finance ministers of EU countries that his country has 18,000 vacancies for labourers.

Apparently he stopped believing in the successful integration and shared his opinion on Facebook that they must do everything that they can to refuse migrants and the quota system, even at the cost of sanctions. According to him, Europe must think of the security of its own people primarily, not of humanitarian assistance. After the Paris attacks, he said that under the migration waves, the Islamic State sends warriors to Europe, who aim to kill people and this is obviously an act of war. ANO urged the EU to close the borders and set up border guards because there is a collapse of the Schengen area and threatened people to take justice into their own hands. The party wants to retain their country's sovereignty, their own decisions about immigration policy and demography. Because of the rapid turnaround, Kristýna Zeličková MEP left ANO. Last year, she accused the government of only reflecting negatively on the issue of migration but contributing nothing of use. She justified quitting the party with Babiš' wavering behaviour. However, occasionally there are signs of progressive thinking. For instance, according to Ivana Dobešová's blogpost⁴, a new tide of immigrants is to be expected due to drinking water reservoirs drying up in the Middle East; however, a possible method of prevention of such a scenario in her opinion would be the investment in projects concerning turning seawater into drinking water.

Denmark

Radikale Venstre came to power in 2011, forming a coalition government. The government allocated 6 million Euros to employment centres in order to provide employment oriented integration programs to refugees and migrants, since according to research, only a quarter of refugees are able to find work within 10 years. For this action plan to gain popularity, a billboard campaign was initiated. On the posters Prime Minister Helle-Thorning Schmidt

4 <http://www.anobudelip.cz/cs/o-nas/blogy/25775/kazdy-stat-ma-suverenni-pravo-si-sam-rozhodnout-koho-prijme-a-komu-pomuze>

encourages migrants to find a job. During the elections held in the middle of the immigration crisis, the oppositionist “blue bloc” was victorious, who campaigned with a much stricter immigration policy. In September, the new government was advertising its tightening of the rules concerning migrants in Lebanese newspapers. In January, Denmark passed a controversial bill giving them the power to seize assets and valuables of refugees. The new Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, plans further strengthening of the rules, for instance he proposes that in order to obtain a permanent residence permit, an individual has to have lived in Denmark for at least eight years, as opposed to the previous six.

According to the social liberal party, Radikale Venstre, immigrants have much to contribute. They want to give foreigners the opportunity to participate in society and meet them with both requirements and expectations - just like everyone else. The former government gave asylum seekers the chance to educate themselves, work and live outside asylum centres, and they presented proposals for faster and more business-oriented integration efforts based on the resources refugees come with. They don't support the immigration policy of Venstre government which has taken an entirely opposite line. Radikale Venstre wants to continue to grant asylum to refugees who are entitled to Denmark's protection. According to their statement, they must be ready to accept more refugees than they have done in recent years - including as part of common European solutions to the current refugee crisis.

The party established a thematic website⁵ which deals with the refugee crisis on a day to day basis. In their opinion, the integration measures should start from day one. Denmark cannot afford for refugees to spend up to a year in asylum centres without getting started with integration. The party's internal

5 <http://flygtning.radikale.dk/>

solution consisted of eight separate points.⁶

First of all, the basic purpose is for reception centres to be changed. The centres will not only provide the framework for asylum seekers waiting while their applications are being processed, they must also be transformed into “regional integration centres” alongside the municipalities in the centres’ catchment area. When an asylum seeker receives a residence permit, local authorities must be ready to run the previously prepared integration plan that can be activated by the local municipality of residence from the first day. The integration plan is drawn up by the receiving municipality, the asylum centre and the refugees in collaboration.

Secondly, targeted placement of refugees in municipalities is essential. Municipalities are urged to get their refugee quota met with refugees from an asylum centre in their region. This provides an incentive for municipalities to get involved in the integration process, giving the refugees the opportunity to establish lasting ties to people, find jobs, be familiarised with the culture and make steps towards becoming an active part of the local community.

Social liberals think that Employment Considerations should be followed where appropriate. If a refugee seems to be better suited for a job that is under the supervision of a different municipality than the one they are currently supervised by, and given the partner institution is willing to accept them, they should be transferred.

The establishment of a job portal is advised, which can be used by municipalities to advertise vacant jobs in their region, allowing for regional demand and skills/qualifications of the job seeking refugees to be matched.

6 <https://www.radikale.dk/system/files/Dokumenter/VaerdigIntegration.pdf>

The starting point should be that all asylum seekers must participate in workplace activities in their local area or perform tasks in the asylum centre for receiving benefits in the form of cash. Asylum seekers experiencing trauma or other mental or physical disorders should of course be exempted from this requirement.

There is already a possibility for asylum seekers to receive higher cash benefit given they actively take part in their community. However, the above proposal will make it a part of the general practice that asylum seekers carry out tasks that are in the shared interest of the community - for example, education of rural residents, maintenance of buildings and land care, voluntary work in the local area - or stick to an occupation for a longer period of time. Asylum centre operators should have the freedom to develop and draw up processes and models to meet these new requirements, preferably in cooperation with local businesses and the regional municipality. Activities must be developed so that they aim at gradually increasing training and maintenance skills of the individual asylum seeker.

All asylum seekers with a qualification in education must have assistance to get their training skills assessed in relation to the Danish labour market in the asylum phase. This should start within three weeks of the asylum seeker's arrival at the asylum centre during which process the asylum seekers are not to be transferred.

The Ministry of Education has an established and mobile team of experts, who visit the asylum centres at fixed intervals and offer onsite advice regarding the assessment of asylum seekers' education and guidance on job opportunities.

It is companies that are able to best assess the specific skills that asylum seekers possess in relation to the Danish labour market. Therefore, undertaking partnerships with companies to make an initial screening of the labour skills of asylum seekers in relation to the Danish labour market is advised and urged. The screening must: form the basis of the selection process of suitable candidates, offering them internships or jobs at a company as early as the asylum phase; ensure prior learning through traineeships, and clarify the most urgent job training and further education needs in order to identify the shortest path to self-reliance; form the basis for the need to establish an integration plan for refugees when they are transferred from the asylum centre to be received by a different municipality.

Partnerships must be established between companies and asylum centres, which are situated in the same region. The state is responsible for the partnerships established and the competency of the screening carried out.

The opportunity for asylum seekers to earn on their own is valuable for both the individual and the society. It was therefore an important measure when the SR- government gave asylum seekers the opportunity to do real work. Today, asylum seekers are not allowed to work before having spent six months in Denmark. This is an unnecessary restriction. Therefore, we will make it legal for asylum seekers to work from day one in the asylum centres.

Today there are far too few asylum seekers who take advantage of the opportunity to work while they are in the asylum phase. It is largely due to there being too many barriers in the way of expanding this opportunity. This problem could potentially be solved by the following initiatives: companies must be pre-approved to hire asylum seekers as soon as the authorities state that asylum seekers are eligible for employment under Danish conditions. Pre-

approved companies can employ asylum seekers as soon as an application is submitted without delay; applicants must be able to pay the transportation costs before setting off (in reality however, some asylum seekers are unable to afford to take work because of this financial responsibility); applicants must be able to obtain a temporary identification number, as soon as they need it. For many larger companies, it is a significant barrier in the employment of asylum seekers that they do not have a Social Security number as their HR systems, payroll, insurance, etc. requires a social security number. It is also a problem to open a bank account, if one is not in possession of a social security number.

Some asylum seekers come to Denmark with qualifications of higher education in their luggage. Often, however, there is a need to supplement such qualifications before they can be used in Denmark - for instance ensuring that the training meets the social requirements of the given profession in Denmark.

Based on the Education Ministry's new knowledge of asylum seekers' training skills, the Ministry of Education in agreement with institutes of higher education, is aiming to ensure access to existing English language courses for refugees who may thus obtain the necessary skills to continue in their profession once in Denmark.

In addition, funds will be allocated to create targeted turbo courses in English for special cases where there is a great match between the skills of a group of refugees and the needs of the Danish labour market - and where a targeted competence supplement can allow refugees to enter the labour market as soon as possible.

To give refugees better opportunity to quickly gain a foothold in the labour market, a phasing of wages for refugees should be implemented for a limited period. This should help ensure that refugees are not kept out of the labour market while they learn Danish and acquire knowledge of the Danish labour market. A concrete model is to be developed in tripartite negotiations with the social partners.

Finland

The ruling Centre Party of Finland (Keskusta) is faced with the fact that there will be constant seeking of asylum. According to their immigration policy of last year⁷, the list of safe countries must be kept up to date because it would be easier to turn back those who are not entitled to a refugee status. The government has already updated the list and tightened restrictions on giving residence permits to asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia in May of this year, saying it was now largely safe for them to go back to their country of origin. They also want to guarantee the security of Finland's border due to continuation of the good co-operation with Russia to prevent getting terrorists and other criminals into the country. Keskusta is planning to fight against terrorism by reforming legislation which ensures fundamental and human rights. The reform must enable the security police to execute private and international operations. The party called on the Nordic states to guarantee that none of them will create more attractive possibilities for newcomers.

On the topic of integration, Keskusta thinks that it must begin immediately after arrival and immigrants have to find a job or other activities as soon as possible because idleness could lead to crime. This is the only way for migrants to be entitled to social benefits. Their integration policy also includes language studies, practical guidance on democracy, information on equality

7 <http://www.keskusta.fi/loader.aspx?id=b5ee93da-5e43-4af9-b930-2225cf76411f>

between the sexes, respect of human rights and the explanation that child abuse is a crime. They urge the participation of women in full employment and language studies because it is an important key in the integration of whole families. Liberals assign essential roles to municipalities: they must prepare the reception and integration plan of refugees in cooperation with the local business community and non-governmental organizations. Finally, Keskusta wanted to allow solutions and experiments in the integration and employment of immigrants and it is ready to pass the decision-making of employment policy to municipalities. Finally, they planned to introduce the law of Finland for refugees, including disallowance of bigamy and child marriages.

On a global level, they strongly believe that the only viable solution to the refugee flow is to restore peace in regions which are suffering from war. Refugees must be helped as close as possible to their homeland and the conditions in the refugee camps urgently need to improve with the help of international cooperation. EU28 must cooperate to manage the situation and the member states must comply with the collective agreements and decisions. Finnish liberals also distinguish refugees from economic migrants but they will give them an opportunity, in accordance with the rules of labour immigration.

Around 33,500 people applied for asylum in 2015 as opposed to 3,600 in 2014, with most of them coming from countries mentioned above. Numbers have decreased significantly this year. The migrant crisis is a political as well as a financial challenge for the coalition of Finland and the government proposed increasing capital gains tax and income tax on high earners so the country was not ready to receive large numbers of refugees. Moreover, 4100 asylum seekers withdrew their application for a refugee status in the Nordic State by February of 2016. Two thirds of the applicants were young Iraqi men and the vast majority justified their reason for leaving by the cold weather or negative attitudes toward immigrants.

Germany

The German liberal party, Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) has proposed ten separate points as their stand on immigration policy.⁸

Firstly, it should be exclusively the federal government's responsibility to bear any costs arising from the reception and settlement of refugees. Rules and regulations regarding the immigration process and asylum protection must be laid down.

Furthermore, the federal government is in charge of assessing applications, and therefore it is their duty to make a decision about reception or rejection of immigrants case by case. However, it is the regional municipalities that hold responsibility for the integration of refugees into society and their immediate community as well as for their entry onto the labour market.

Secondly, the FDP is convinced that the procedure through which refugee status is granted needs reformation. The current course of action will not be able to deal with the foreseeably large number of applications. So far, 4000 applications have been assessed case by case, and only 45 were rejected. The system needs a thorough remake, as besides its inefficiency, the current administrative methods require too much financial funding.

The third highlighted point, is a suggestion by the FDP to speed up the decision making process. One way of achieving this is by increasing the number of decision making officials (the other being the reformation of the procedure itself, as mentioned in the second point).

8 <https://www.liberales.de/content/beschluss-des-fdp-praesidiums-10-punkte-fuer-eine-bessere-fluechtlings-und>

Point four calls on non-regulated immigration from the West Balkan region to be better controlled and more closely monitored. This is essential, because half of those arriving in Germany come from Balkan states. These people leave their countries due to bad living and working condition hoping for a brighter future in Western Europe. Therefore, they must too, be considered asylum seekers. It is ironic that thousands of young and healthy men and women wait hopelessly for their admittance, only to be returned to their country a couple of weeks later, when German industry is in desperate need of young workforce. Balkan countries should be categorized as safe countries, and they should be visa-bound. However, the FDP states that Germany's immigration policy needs to be liberalized, and a work visa lax is suggested in the case of scientists and professionals. An agreement should be reached between the Federal Employment Agency and the Balkan states in order to match employment oriented migration with the needs and demands of the German labour market. This way, migrants could start work straight away upon their arrival.

The fifth point calls on the work prohibition binding migrants to be abolished. The FDP believes, that anyone who is able to support themselves should be given the opportunity to work. With the help of standardized questionnaires, professional potential and competency could be identified at a very early stage.

In point six, the FDP expresses their wish to see the entire integration process done in German, from day one. German language and integration courses should be offered across the country free of charge and should be made compulsory. Children should receive special focus in terms of learning the native language, and therefore they too, should be allowed and encouraged to participate. The topic of immigration should come up in school discussions and become part of the education of children.

Point seven concerns the education and training of young refugees. The FDP believes that it is essential for youngsters to receive help in building their future, as according to them they owe this both to the young refugees and to their own country, since they will be the specialists and experts of the future. Therefore, this is beneficent and vital for Germany.

Most of the young asylum seekers are very motivated. Anyone of them, who claims to be trained, should be tested. Since it is very important to create a peaceful atmosphere, these refugees should not be under threat of being sent home for the duration of the 18 months of the training. They must also have access to healthcare and education.

The FDP declares in point eight, that bureaucracy in healthcare must be reduced. According to them, refugees should have the right to visit doctors. This would be necessary since the assigned authorities are overloaded, and separate treatment may lead refugees to feel like inferior citizens. Therefore, refugees should be issued with a Health Insurance Card. It is the government's responsibility to make contracts with insurance companies to facilitate this. Moreover, a sufficient number of doctors and nurses is required.

In their penultimate point of suggested changes to the government's current immigration policy, the FDP highlights the need for the distribution of the workload. They argue that solidarity is needed across Europe, as it is people's lives we are dealing with, and this should be contemplated and accepted by every member state. The Dublin Regulation is not well functioning. Ideally, every refugee would be taken in by one of the member states. Of course population ratio, unemployment, economic situation and geographical factors will be considered. A compensation fund needs to be set up.

Lastly, a more ambitious proposal is made by the FDP: they are determined that the EU should eliminate the causes of the crisis. The causes include wars, terrorism and poverty. To be effective, development tools, humanitarian projects and economic plans must be put into place. Any states wishing to become part of the EU should be informed that their acceptance is subject to conditions. These include the prevalence of the rule of law and the willingness to grant rights to minorities.

Hungary

The massive wave of refugees has not yet reached the EU borders when the anti immigration campaign was launched by the Hungarian government. Every billboard in the country instructed immigrants to obey and respect the Hungarian law and culture. Later, a National Consultation was announced, which included the following questions alongside others not listed: You can hear about the increasing acts of terrorism. How significant is the expansion of terrorism in terms of impacting our life (Bloodshed in France, ISIS' alarm acts)?, Do you think that Hungary will be a target for terrorists in the future?, Did you know that economic immigrants cross the Hungarian border illegally and the number of immigrants increased twenty-fold in the last period in Hungary?

One can claim without bias that the above questions lack any objectivity but the government's anti-immigrant narrative is conveyed clearly. More than 1 million people answered the National Consultation followed by the publication of the results, which brought no surprise, and all implied the same message. In short: Hungary must be protected. According to TÁRKI's research⁹, the government's campaign against migrants was successful. It revealed from

9 http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2015/kitekint/20150505_idegen.html

the Gallup poll that the hatred against migrants has peaked. Furthermore, it showed that 46 per cent of Hungarians are xenophobe and the vast majority of them (94%) rejected people of Arab ethnicity. Moreover, the hatred has increased among opposition voters. The government primarily dealt with the inciting campaign, casting the real problem and the pressure to solve it aside. In the middle of June, the government decided to build a fence on the Hungarian-Serbian border. After the first news, the world press picked up the topic and many western politicians expressed their resentment. The southern fence construction was launched with great confusion. The soldiers were sent down disorganized and they were faced with food, water and accommodation supply problems. This is the reason behind the government replacing Csaba Hende, minister of defence. 4,300 soldiers started closing the border. In the middle of September, the Serbian-Hungarian border was closed. According to Nézőpont Institute's research¹⁰, the support of the closed border increased by 18% in a week following the atrocity of the 16th of September.¹¹ As a result, nearly three-quarter (73%) of Hungarians supported the closed border policy.

The Hungarian Liberal Party (MLP) mostly voiced their critical views regarding this topic, but came up with no real solutions. Despite the party's support being around 1% according to public opinion research, MLP's president, Gábor Fodor received a parliamentary mandate as a result of an oppositionist election alliance in 2014. Being an independent representative, he has little to no opportunity to voice his opinions, but he did confront the government with their 2013 immigration policy during the talks about amendments of the asylum law.¹² In this policy, the government declares that prosperity, re-

10 <http://nezopontintezet.hu/analysis/tavaly-szeptember-ota-nem-volt-ilyen-eros-fidesz-kdnp/>

11 At the southern border, several hundred people started a demonstration and then they broke through the fence with a few vocal leaders. The police used tear gas and water cannons and the refugees thrown stones and water bottles at them.

12 <http://www.parlament.hu/irom40/05028/05028.pdf>

distribution and pension may be aided by the controlled inlet of qualified workforce, alongside the need for manpower supply in certain sectors of the labour market. In his speech, Fodor explained, that three quarters of the expenses of refugee catering were provided by the EU. Moreover, he pointed out his proposition in which he suggests the modification of a number of rules of conduct when dealing with refugees, due to their inhumane nature, including rules regarding family unification and communication. Fodor stated that Hungary should embrace this situation wisely and empathically, aligning with the EU's expectations, also outlining that in his opinion, the quota system is a sensible idea. He was eager to save Hungary from a negative international reputation.

When the quota system was put on the EU's schedule, the government launched a petition against the "forceful quota", followed by the proposition to call for a referendum on this matter. Which had gone through. The referendum consists of the following question: "Do you want to allow the European Union to mandate the resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens to Hungary without the approval of the National Assembly?" The referendum however, is utterly pointless, as the governmental majority could pass a law regarding this anytime. Therefore, the referendum itself has no influence over the legitimization of the quota system. In Hungary's case, this would mean the resettlement of 1294 refugees from Greece and Italy, who are to be taken in by the EU. Therefore, this referendum is no more than a tool for pressurization, through which the government can more firmly reject their obligation regarding the quota in Brussels. The Hungarian liberals were triggered by this decision and turned to the Supreme Court of Hungary, as they found the question unlawful on many points. According to Fodor, the referendum proposal is only intended to polarize opinion within Hungary as well as to instigate a conflict between the Hungarian people and the EU.

More widely supported oppositionist parties (apart from the right wing nationalist party Jobbik), urge their supporters to boycott the referendum, since according to them, a question that does not make sense cannot be answered properly. The main reason behind this action however, is most likely to be the fact that oppositionist parties are highly unlikely to be politically undamaged if they were to consider the question seriously. Among the democratic oppositionists, only the liberals encourage their supporters to vote with a 'yes'. They backed up their decision by stating that the referendum is about European values and being part of Europe and the EU. The referendum has no associated legal significance, but a rather noteworthy domestic marketing value, alongside the potential to attract international interest. However, the quota is not supported by MLP, as that would mean giving up the Schengen system. According to the data published by the Eurobarometer, the Hungarian government successfully thematised colloquial language, and while Hungary is not a target country and the quota is quite generous, a third of the population already ranks the immigration problem as one of the most pressing issues. The referendum that is to be held on the second of October 2016 will be valid and successful according to most surveys and opinion polls.

Netherlands

The ruling right-wing Liberal party, VVD went public with a new refugee policy in March of 2015.¹³ The seven-page document states that Europe should change its refugee policy and close its borders. Immigrants should be provided with safe accommodation in their own region, possibly with the EU's help. Their statement did not change. On the other hand, the social-liberal D66 published its action plan of refugee crisis in October of 2015. In their point of view, Netherlands is strong enough to cope with this situation.

13 <https://d66.nl/content/uploads/sites/2/2015/10/Actieplan-vluchtelingen-D66-online.pdf>

D66 does not pretend to have the answer to the refugee problem but would submit proposals to deal with the three major challenges facing the country. With the selection of genuine refugees, welcoming them with the citizens' support and starting their integration from the first day.

The party admits that the vast majority of asylum seekers escaped their country because of war but there are also people who do not flee from violence, but who try to take advantage of this emergency. Netherlands must focus on the real refugees and offer shelter for them. When they composed the action plan, the EU was engaged with the creation of European application centres at the external borders and only one was operational. According to them, the result is well known; unregistered people flooded Europe, with all the chaotic consequences. The reception centres have to be able to decide that who does actually qualify for refugee status, and then these people can be fairly distributed across Europe. After a quick but careful procedure, people who are not entitled to asylum can be returned as quickly as possible to their country of origin. European cooperation is badly needed, for example to persuade countries to take their nationals back through European diplomacy. As D66 described, in average, asylum seekers spend four months in the emergency shelter before they submit their asylum application and this time is increasing. Many immigrants introduce themselves as Syrian while - for example - Egyptians probably are not entitled to asylum status and these people occupy precious places in emergency shelters. The party suggests that authorities should record a short tape that interpreters can analyse to determine where persons come from. If the fake nationality identified and the person is really not eligible for asylum status, Netherlands has to send him or her back to their country of origin. This could be a solution to provide places for those who are actually in danger.

D66 strongly believes that in the Netherlands nobody should sleep on the streets. That is why the country had to act quickly. In their point of view, the breaking of agreements with municipalities is not acceptable. The government has every opportunity to try to improve existing agreements, but these should not be violated. D66 and the government has also called for non-violation agreements with municipalities on asylum reception and for consultation with the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) to use vacant public properties as reception centres for asylum seekers as soon as possible. According to D66, some examples show that municipalities could offer shelter, even when large numbers of refugees arrive in a small community but it goes wrong when existing agreements are violated. The party claims that many municipalities would like to help with small-scale shelter in abandoned schools and health centres but the COA does not accept small locations due to high costs. Liberals think that COA should become more flexible because smaller shelters can often count for greater support among local residents. They also warned the government to make a realistic estimate of the expected inflows and to adapt the budget.

They thought that the most urgent problem is the appropriate care and the integration. D66 does not want to waste time and pushes the immediate teaching of Dutch to immigrants. The mandatory language courses must start in the emergency shelters with the financial support of the government. As they wrote, this is a valuable investment and the first key to successful integration. Liberals do not back the government's plan to stretch the naturalization process from five to seven years because the current rule is more motivating for refugees. The main goal in the integration procedure is for refugees to find their own level in the labour market and this is the reason why D66 calls on the government to recognize foreign qualifications of higher education that refugees may possess. Authorities must be responsible for identifying a suit-

able place where they are able to make use of their talents or contribute to the local community. The current restrictions hinder the asylum seekers and therefore it was suggested by D66 that refugees should be allowed to begin work immediately as opposed to six months after arrival. The liberal party also proposed that immigrants should be able to work for 52 weeks instead of 24. They urged the government to rebuild care complexes, office buildings and government buildings into small residential units.

Poland

The Civic Platform (PO) was in government up until October of last year, and preferred voluntarism. In the end they accepted the quota system- the only ones out of the V4 members to do so. This was done despite anti-immigration demonstrations being organised and the PO being suspected of corruption, which greatly lowered the party's chance of victory. During the elections in October, the Law and Justice (PiS) came into power, with Jarosław Kaczyński pulling the strings from behind the scenes. The party's first major action concerning immigration was to pull out of the quota system accepted by the previously reigning government, the PO. According to Beata Szydło PM, Poland is not ready to receive seven thousand refugees. Similarly to Viktor Orbán, she justified the party's refusal of the quota system with security reasons. PiS's actions were not surprising, following Kaczyński's statement according to which it is dangerous to receive immigrants as they may "spread contagious tropical disease". In Szydło's opinion, it was the failed immigration policy of Brussels that led to Great Britain voting to leave the EU. He believes that the EU needs to allocate more money to prevent illegal immigration.

Nowoczesna, formed last year, got into Sejm with 7,6% and has gained so much popularity since then, that by the next elections Nowoczesna could

easily challenge the currently governing party. Ryszard Petru president of liberals told the press that the Polish government has no migrant policy. The government should agree to accept migrants because in the past Poles themselves enjoyed the hospitality of other countries. Moreover, Poles share values that oblige them to help those in need. In his opinion, the Polish government has to negotiate in Brussels and put emphasis on the financial aid required for the sheltering of the immigrants rather than the actual quota itself. According to Nowoczesna's statement, Poland is obliged to help refugees by humanitarian and legal means such as e.g. The Refugee Geneva Convention which Poland joined in 1991. However, the country is unable to accept big numbers of immigrants. The country does not have sufficient funds or relevant procedures which would make it possible to help refugees effectively and integrate them smoothly. To facilitate this, Poland should closely cooperate with the EU in order to develop an effective and cohesive policy, which will not turn against their interests. They differentiate between the definition of a refugee and economic migrant. In their point of view, Poland cannot afford this type of emigration.

Romania

Traditionally, Romania is not targeted by immigrants, mostly because it is not part of Schengen. As a result of this, there is not as much debate about immigration and immigration policy as in many other European states, but the general European problem of immigration appears in Romania too. The newly formed ALDE member, ALDE Romania, ruling in coalition, has no available statement on immigration but the EPP member and the main opposition National Liberal Party's (PNL) view can easily be guessed from press releases and some interviews.

According to PNL, Romania, along with other European countries, will have to cope with the refugee crisis and receive refugees who were allocated by the European Union. They believe that Romania is ready to receive many refugees and want to inhibit those political voices that generate fear and state that immigrants who seek peace, are terrorists. To offer support to people who escaped their country because of wars is a humanitarian duty. Children could resume their studies, learn a new language and adapt a new cultural context. They must ensure fundamental rights, including access to education. Otherwise, these refugees and asylum seekers will require social assistance for a long time. In their point of view, Orthodox Romanians should act with love for one another, based on the Christian faith. As PNL reminded, until the early 1990s, many Romanians chose to start a new life in one of the Western countries, where they arrived as refugees or asylum seekers.

According to Ramona Mănescu MEP, the issue of migration and refugees is an effect, not a cause. In her approach, European institutions lack realism, pragmatism and vision. Primarily, Europe needs an action plan to address the causes of these migratory waves. European countries are not ready to receive such large numbers of migrants safely. Cătălin Predoiu vice president of PNL wrote on their website that the most fatal mistake any European can make in such a crisis as this one, is abandoning their European values, which were and will be the basis of the European construction: humanity, solidarity, legality. Consequently, the migration flow is not a problem for Romania but the EU is the one who has to find the solution and must make more than a humanitarian effort.

Sweden

The current immigration crisis has put a lot of pressure on Sweden, as in 2015, the Scandinavian country was the second most targeted destination by immigrants after Germany. Sweden with a population of 9,8 million has received 163,000 refugees over the course of the last year, resulting in the highest ratio in the whole of Europe. The government lead by the Social Democrats and the Greens has decided on a stricter immigration policy in July, which will apply to migrants who submitted their application after November 24, 2015. According to the new immigration policy, for the next three years, authorities will only be able to issue temporary residence permits to migrants alongside limiting family reunification. The new regulations will not apply to asylum seekers who have been distributed between EU member states according to the quota system.

The opposition Centerpartiet's general immigration policy has always been openness and progressivity. For instance, during the run up to the 2006 elections, the party campaigned with the proposal to double the number of migrants in the country, and suggested in 2012 the complete opening of the borders, in an attempt to adopt the Canadian model. They believe that foreign workforce contributes to welfare. From the beginning, they wanted to simplify the rules for those who want to work and for businesses that want to hire. Their policy focuses more on the available power and desires the requirement that labour immigrants must have a profession to get a work permit and wishes to shorten this procedure. They would also like to provide an opportunity for migrants who have lived and worked in Sweden for at least 2 years to start a business and make it possible for third country students to study for free. Centerpartiet thinks that labour migration must be regulated at EU level by the Blue Card and it is very important for the whole continent

because more than 2 million jobs are not filled. The Blue Card allows more people the opportunity to seek jobs in Europe and could help the labour market become more balanced. In their point of view, everybody should have the same chance of getting a job, a home, an education or start a business. They want Sweden to continue to be characterized by tolerance and openness and welcome differences. According to their statement on the party's webpage, the facts show that Sweden needs an integration policy, not an immigration policy and that is why they are not planning any special solutions that are targeted at people who have arrived there. To solve some of the practical problems of integration in Sweden, they have several proposals. These include traineeships with lower wages, faster validation of knowledge, previous learning, establishment benefits that make it worthwhile to work, and full compensation to the municipalities.

The largest influx of refugees of the modern times requires a special answer and they tried to give one. The party agreed¹⁴ with the government and other alliance parties on a series of actions which allow for the country to receive 5000 refugees instead of the previous 1900 and secure more legal channels to settling in Sweden. They believe that job is the key into the community. In their opinion, the RUT-sector (cleaning, maintenance and laundry) could absorb significant number of unemployed migrants. Lot of people of foreign origin thus may be integrated and included in society. Sweden needs lower thresholds to the labour market because simplification of rules will facilitate newcomers to get their first job. Work should be combined with education as well. Centerpartiet has pushed through a requirement that municipalities will also receive enhanced compensation to reduce pressure on the local economy. The agreement included 1 billion Euros, 21 million went to civil organisations. Municipalities need simplified rules for housing and the op-

14 <https://www.centerpartiet.se/var-politik/alla-fragor/migration-och-integration/insatser-med-anledning-av-flyktingkrisen/>

portunity to seek support if they build homes and receive new refugees. They would oppose idleness – as early as during the application procedure all refugees should get Swedish tuition and social studies. Also, the application procedure must be shortened. Newcomers who have been working as teachers teaching students who speak the same language should be trained. Alongside this, additional training and validation occur. Temporary residence permit temporarily introduced as a rule for three years. Exceptions apply for quota refugees, unaccompanied minors and families with children, who continue to receive permanent residence as a rule. According to rough estimates, this group makes up just over half of all asylum seekers. Those not covered by the exemption will get permanent residence after three years if there are still security grounds or if they may have a taxable income that they can support themselves.

According to the second opposition liberal party, Liberalerna, to cope with an increase in asylum reception, Sweden must have a policy that they keep to at all times and that gives people real opportunities to integrate into Swedish society.¹⁵ They want to hold up the right of asylum, provide a humane and legally secure immigration policy and push the EU to make a fair and common asylum policy. It has to be managed properly, requires major and urgent reforms. Liberalerna believes that the establishment of migration courts in Sweden were a major step for asylum seekers. The party proposes the review and evaluation of such reforms after a period of time, to ensure they are influencing the issue as originally intended on, and in the right direction.

Liberalerna believes that the right of asylum must be protected, and that as a result, the issue of asylum reception needs to be dealt with. Moreover, they declare that the main responsibility for refugee reception should be taken by

¹⁵ <https://www.liberalerna.se/politik/invandring/>

the state, which is currently the case; however, according to Liberalerna the levels of state compensation need to be adjusted. Liberalerna states that general welfare should be protected and that it does not oppose solidarity-based refugee policy.

The party goes on to suggest the need for the establishment of a common refugee agency at EU-level. They furthermore highlight their disappointment at not every member state accepting their share of the quotas, creating an uneven distribution, but think positively of the newly proposed system which aims to grant international protection to those asylum seekers who are in need of it. These seem to be steps towards general and well-spread solidarity regarding the reception of refugees across Europe. However, they stress the immediate need for an action plan in the case of an emergency (immigration tide), and the necessity of legal escape routes to the EU to ensure the safe journey of asylum seekers. Liberalerna calls for the abolishment of visa laws in the case of a conflict, so that refugees can flee the area immediately.

The party furthermore proposes that the European Asylum Support Office take over from national authorities the examination of applications, and states that they will push the EU to become more welcoming towards economic migrants, arguing that immigration in general is essential in meeting the challenge of demographic changes that both Sweden and the EU are facing.

Moreover, Liberalerna declares the importance of taking into consideration the perspective of the children during the asylum process, and that children should have a right to asylum. The party pushes for residence permits to be granted to every person under the age of 18 automatically.

The party urges the authorities to agree with municipalities to increase the intake of quota refugees with disabilities, upon the request of the UN refugee agency UNHCR. The Migration Board has commissioned the development of support initiatives and strategies.

The party heavily emphasizes Sweden's need for industrious and well-educated people if the country is to continue to grow and prosper. Therefore, Liberalerna calls for the reformation of the labour regulations. They believe that it should be made easier to apply for a residence permit, and that foreign students should be allowed to apply for jobs once they have finished their education. The party clearly states that temporary workers as well new residents should be welcomed into Sweden.

Moreover, it is the party's wish to see work permits abolished and consider anyone residing in Sweden legally employable. Currently the Swedish Migration Court had the power to deport refugees. Liberalerna argues that if a person is instructed to leave the country and return to their country of origin, the conditions of the initial residence permit they were granted are violated. However, they also suggest the introduction of minimum wage, below which individuals may no longer be able to extend their residence permit. Moreover, they propose to give foreign students six months after completing their education to find a job.

Liberalerna proposes the establishment of a national coordination system for the allocation of funds intended for different integration efforts. The party hopes to encourage municipalities and civil society to take active part in the integration process of refugees.

Moreover, the party proposes the lowering of the labour market threshold, meaning the creation of entry-level jobs by making the employment of foreign individuals cheaper. The aim is to give more refugees access to jobs, and consequently increasing the successfulness of their integration.

Liberalerna suggests taking money from the state budget and allocating it to give support to organizations doing effective work in Romania for example. They believe that Sweden should work together with the home countries to provide assistance and exchange of experts in the development of schools, social services and job creation. Furthermore, MRI examination of the member states should be strengthened and penalties imposed on those member states who fail the EU's fundamental values.

United Kingdom

The Liberal Democrats have a clear cut and straightforward immigration policy. This is summed up concisely and to the point on their website, where they state that immigrants are very welcome, as long as they contribute to the United Kingdom's economy and prosperity in general and integrate into society and their community smoothly. An emphasis is put on strict and strong border checks, as well as the statement of the general requirements towards anyone wishing to set foot in Britain. The first of these is for refugees to learn English in order to become a useful and active part of their immediate community and society in general. Of course, this also enables employees to look to immigrants in search of workforce, which evidently is a fruitful prospect from an economic point of view. The Liberal Democrats frankly state on their web page that it is only hard working immigrants they are willing to open the British borders to, emphasizing that benefits seeking individuals are most passionately unwanted. This becomes ever more apparent in a 2014 article in

the Independent on ‘Immigration and Welfare’, where the Liberal Democrats propose a new Universal Credits eligibility criteria, obliging immigrants to have worked for at least six months before receiving benefits.¹⁶ Moreover, it is specified that in-work benefits are only to be paid to those working a 35-hour week on the minimum wage. Furthermore, Universal Credits are only to be paid for up to six months.

The leader of the Liberal Democrats, Tim Farron, however, shows that the party does hold very humane values as detailed in the party leader’s letter sent to all MPs in April 2016 in a plea to convince parliament to amend the Immigration Bill in order to allow for the uptake of an additional 3,000 child refugees scattered across Europe. Farron states that British values call for such measures and it is Britain’s moral obligation to help those in need. In the previous year, the Liberal Democrats, together with Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Tom Brake, had called for an urgent parliamentary debate expressing their desire to see the British government do more to help refugees arriving in Europe. Tim Farron, having visited a refugee camp in Calais, was even more determined upon his return to push this through, stating that “This is a humanitarian crisis which shames our country. We must step up to the plate to tackle it.” Furthermore, Farron was the first senior politician to back the EU quota system, calling on Britain to let in 60,000 refugees. Although a very humane gesture, Farron did admit that besides helping those in need, welcoming immigrants is also in the interest of the UK: “First and foremost it is about compassion, but also there is enlightened self-interest.” It must also be noted that Farron’s actions are part of the Liberal Democrats emphasizing their pro-EU stand.

16 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/immigration-and-welfare-where-do-the-tories-labour-ukip-and-lib-dems-stand-9891064.html>

The European liberal solution - the 7 propositions of ALDE¹⁷

ALDE, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, had been forming their immigration policy throughout 2015, but their defined and complete draft was finalized in February 2016 aiming to solve the immigration crisis in Europe.

Every political strategy designed to address the immigration crisis so far has failed. The Dublin Regulation has proved to be unsustainable and is therefore not implemented by the EU member states. Agreements with Turkey are not effective and show no positive results, whilst migrants stationed in refugee camps and asylum centres experience horrible and inhumane conditions. Furthermore, no agreement has been reached on the topic of European borders and the Coast Guard, the introduction of the Blue Card has not taken place, which would have greatly aided the process of legal immigration.

The only propositions contributed by the member states so far have included closing the borders to deter immigrants and the creation of the national quota system by country. It is noted with regret that the Temporary Protection Directive has not been activated six months ago, despite its promising nature in terms of solving similar crises.

The Dutch Prime Minister, Rutte, alongside Juncker and Tusk, made a statement in which they forecast the end of Schengen if nothing is done. ALDE agrees and identifies with this declaration, as they believe Europe is in a state of emergency. They propose seven urgent measures to be accepted by the European Council in February in order to save the EU.

17 <https://www.apply.eu/Docs/ALDERoadmapRefugeeCrisis-2feb2016.pdf>

The first of these is the creation of the European Rapid Refugee Emergency Force (ERREF) invoking article 78.3: In the event of one or more member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals from third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefits of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament. Schengen will disintegrate in a couple of weeks' time if no action is taken. According to ALDE, the only solution is the establishment of the European Border and the Coast Guard. Unfortunately however, due to the member states' passive and inactive nature, this cannot take place in the foreseeable next few weeks, and therefore urgent action is needed. The ERREF must be set up, which will monitor the external borders (especially the Turkish-Greek border). The tide of refugees across Macedonia and the Balkans must be prevented and stopped, and furthermore the living conditions of refugees stationed in Turkey and the EU must be improved.

Therefore, the ERREF must be established with 2000 civil servants under the supervision of the European Commissioner. The ERREF is to aid member states during safety procedures and fingerprinting, and are responsible for improving living conditions faced by refugees. Most importantly, they are to monitor the Turkish- Greek border.

Secondly, the European Coast and Border Guard (ECBG) needs to be set up. The ERREF is to be integrated into the ECBG, once it is up and running effectively. Approximately 600 million Euros are to be allocated to this project, which is five times the current Frontex budget. It is the responsibility of the member states to find the financial means to produce a sufficient budget collectively, and next year's EU budget will have to take this into account. In ALDE's opinion, any member states that do not support the establishment of

the ECBG should leave Schengen. Furthermore, member states that are not Schengen members will also be required to contribute to the project financially as well as in terms to duties.

The third proposal is to use the 3 billion Euros of the Turkey deal differently, for instance by giving direct assistance to refugees. The Turkey deal did not result in a decrease of the border being crossed. Unfortunately, negotiations with Turkey are difficult, as the EU is in a rather vulnerable position, but the member states have not yet decided on how the allocated money should be spent.

In order to save refugees from choosing the life-threatening option of entering Europe by boat, direct financial aid needs to be given to refugee camps and to the existing UNHCR resettlement procedures. The UNCHR is to be allocated 1 billion Euros for the improvement of living conditions in camps and 2 billion Euros will be spent on basic needs such as food, education and healthcare.

A single asylum procedure should be used across Europe to assess the right of asylum in every case.

The fourth point proposes the change of the current hotspots into reception centres supervised by the ERREF and later by the ECBG. Refugees must stay at these centres until they receive instructions on where to go. This will depend on the category they are put into (asylum seeker or economic migrant). Every member state is obliged to take part in this procedure, and therefore non-compliance will result in exclusion of the member state(s) from Schengen.

Moreover, ALDE states that the Dublin Regulation needs to be succeeded by a single European asylum procedure, as detailed by the fifth point of proposal. According to them, the Dublin Regulation has proved to be ineffective and therefore a failure, as there are too many (28) different asylum procedures. It also became apparent that member states are unable to efficiently manage the immigration crisis. Member states seem to be competing in making themselves look less attractive to refugees in order to be avoided by immigrants. Thus each state sends the refugees to a neighbouring country instead of solving the problem together at an EU level. For instance, asylum seekers are less likely to be admitted in Hungary than they are in Germany, and this causes considerable tension between member states.

The only possible way to resolve this situation in ALDE's point of view is for the Commission to reconsider the use of temporary protection, especially in a crisis as serious as this one. Furthermore, member states ought to reach agreement on a general EU asylum procedure and on a fair distribution of quotas.

The single asylum procedure in the opinion of ALDE, should be drafted by the EU and not its member states.

Moreover, ALDE urges the establishment of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which, together with the ECBG would be responsible for monitoring refugees and deciding on their admittance.

Enough time must be given to member states which are new to the tradition of receiving refugees, allowing them to set up the essential administrative processes for a reception and camping of asylum seekers, in accordance with the international law.

Penultimately, point six deals with the introduction of the Blue Card, which would be similar to the Green Card in the USA. This would somewhat regulate and ensure that those arriving in Europe are qualified and therefore will quickly be able to join the labour market. Such a system would also make it easier to distinguish between asylum seekers and economic migrants. ALDE suggests the extensive revision of the EU Blue Card and the European Job Mobility Portal (EURES), making it a widely ranging European network, that allows for the boundless transfer of both EU and non-EU workers within the member states of the EU.

Lastly, ALDE calls for a European Peace Plan alongside a Marshall Plan for the EU region. With the Syrian situation worsening day by day, Europe absolutely must endeavour to stop the war, as it is the EU alone that is suffering the aftermath. Aggressive actions must come to a halt by every country bound by the Vienna process. This includes immediate ceasefire against civilians in order to give humanitarian organizations access to the area. The EU should work in collaboration with the USA in the implementation of the UNSC Resolution, aiming to set up a non-sectarian government excluding Assad from future Syrian politics.

Globally, ALDE suggests a collaborative international strategy for battling ISIS and establishing a European Defence Community designed to protect the EU from terrorism and other forms of hostile action. Once countries of origin are safe, refugees will be aided in their return home by the European Marshall Plan.


Conclusions

It is not a question that the current tide of migrants has presented a great challenge for the whole of Europe, and we have seen that liberal parties themselves differ at times in their proposed solutions to deal with such a crisis.

The two charts shown below can be of help when attempting to understand the analysed countries' societal attitudes and the competing parties' domestic political motivations and their latitude.

Table 1. What do you think are the two most important issues our country facing at the moment? The following countries stated that immigration is one of the most important issues they are facing. (Source: Eurobarometer 2012-2016)


	May 2012	May 2013	May 2014	May 2015	May 2016
Austria	12%	12%	15%	31%	41%
Belgium	18%	15%	17%	23%	27%
Croatia	0%	1%	1%	3%	6%
Czech Republic	2%	3%	7%	18%	32%
Denmark	9%	10%	20%	35%	57%
Finland	8%	5%	6%	6%	23%
Germany	9%	14%	22%	46%	56%
Hungary	1%	2%	3%	13%	28%
Netherlands	3%	4%	10%	23%	46%
Poland	2%	3%	7%	9%	16%
Romania	1%	2%	3%	3%	6%
Sweden	10%	13%	14%	28%	44%
United Kingdom	21%	32%	41%	35%	38%
EU average	8%	10%	15%	23%	28%



The Eurobarometer survey has been researching people's opinion on what they think the two most pressing issues threatening their country are, for a long time. It is clear that in countries that are traditionally targeted by migrants (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom) a significant percentage of people identified migration as one of the top two problems, whereas in Central Eastern Europe (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) migration was either not mentioned at all, or was given no real significance. After 2014 - simultaneously with the immigration crisis - a noticeable increase in the number of people identifying migration as a main problem can be observed, not only in traditionally targeted countries but also in Eastern European states, such as Romania. Regarding the EU average, since 2012, migration has always been among the top three identified problems. In 2012 and 2013, government debt (19%, 15%) and health and social security (12%, 11%) came first and second respectively, leaving migration as the third most pressing issue on an EU average. By 2014, migration took the first place, overtaking both of the previously mentioned problems. However, identifying migration as one of the most burning obstacles is not the equivalent of refusing to receive and help asylum seekers. Therefore, it is essential to analyse the data shown below.

Table 2. Our country should help refugees? (Source: Eurobarometer, May 2016)

	Agree	Disagree	Do not know
Austria	64%	31%	5%
Belgium	68%	29%	3%
Croatia	69%	27%	4%
Czech Republic	21%	71%	8%
Denmark	83%	15%	2%
Finland	74%	23%	3%
Germany	82%	14%	4%
Hungary	27%	68%	5%
Netherlands	85%	12%	3%
Poland	49%	40%	11%
Romania	36%	56%	8%
Sweden	93%	6%	1%
United Kingdom	74%	19%	7%
EU28	63%	30%	7%



In May 2016 respondents were asked if they believed their country should help migrants. Looking at the responses, a drastic difference can be observed between Western and Eastern European countries. It is evident that the citizens of traditionally targeted countries show considerably more solidarity towards migrants, and what is more, twice as many of them believe that their country ought to help asylum seekers. Moreover, more than 80% of citizens of the two most heavily affected countries during the immigration crisis (Germany and Sweden) hold the opinion that their country should offer help, while Swedish society is most sympathetic towards migrants with their 93%. Meanwhile, Eastern European countries included in the study- with the exception of Croatia - show a very different perspective. The Czech, Hungarian and Romanian respondents are significantly more dismissive. Although the majority in Poland is willing to help, they are still quite below the EU average in terms of percentage.

This Western-Eastern type rupture is obviously present in European liberal parties' immigration policy. We have seen previously that Eastern European liberal parties' willingness to help is solely based on ideological principles and they have no real detailed program regarding this topic. In Western Europe, due to the permanent nature of migration as a debate topic, the issue has be-

come a key political campaign component, and as a result, very specific and detailed programs have emerged. Meanwhile, even during the immigration crisis, Eastern European liberals were not in need of drawing up such a plan, mainly due to the numbers of the quota system relevant to them (Croatia:568; Czech Republic: 1591; Hungary: 1294; Poland: 5082; Romania: 2475)¹⁸, and it is unlikely that it will become necessary for them to do so in the future.

The Czech liberal party ANO, formed in 2011, came second in the 2013 elections and became part of the government coalition. Last year, ANO was publicly pro migration, however, following the terror attacks in Paris, their viewpoint changed noticeably. ANO has not produced a detailed immigration policy, neither before, nor after its remarkable volte-face. According to the survey conducted by the Eurobarometer, out of all the included states, Czech Republic was the most dismissive towards immigrants. Therefore, it is possible, that ANO is attempting to synchronise their narrative with public opinion in time for the 2017 elections. Anyhow, ANO's popularity is stable, shown by TNS Aisa's¹⁹ survey which estimated 29.5% and thus a first place position in the middle of August.

The Hungarian government has allocated vast amounts of money in order to convince citizens that migration is a seriously threatening issue. A campaign was launched as a result of which immigration became a topic of daily discussion, despite Hungary not being a destination country, only part of the route to Western Europe. Interestingly, this topic has exceeded party politics, since moderate oppositionist parties did not have a clear opinion or a not very strongly advocated one. They only criticised the actions of the government and made no practical propositions. The MLP's decision to campaign for voting with "yes" in support of the quota system was surprising, and attracted criticism from oppositionist parties, since most of them encourage citizens to

18 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5698_en.htm

19 http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/sites/default/files/1798317-trendy_ceska_2016_vlna_27_volebni_model.pdf

boycott the referendum in order for the results to be illegitimate preventing Orbán's government from referring to the results in Brussels. On the other hand, Guy Verhofstadt encourages Hungarians to vote with "yes".

Despite Poland having to receive the largest number of refugees based on the EU quota system out of the analysed Eastern European countries and their new government refusing compliance, the liberal Nowoczesna was not pressed to take sides, simply because the issue of immigration is not in limelight in Polish politics. The PiS government was unable to gain political capital from the immigration crisis, as from the very beginning of their reign, they executed systematic and constitutional changes, triggering considerable social resistance. As a result, the civil organisation, Committee for the Defence of Democracy (KOD) took tens of thousands of people to the streets, demonstrating against these reforms, and thus limiting the governmental party's space for further action.

For Western European countries - mainly because they are directly affected – it was necessary to produce concrete proposals. Opposition parties were driven to propose policies surpassing the governmental immigration policy, while parties in government were pressured to find viable solutions to handle the immigration crisis. A number of similarities can be discovered when comparing the immigration policies of Western European countries, namely the emphasis on security, in other words the desire to introduce stricter admission procedures upon arrival, initiations concerning rapid language courses for migrants and their integration, the recognition of certificates and degrees of training and higher education as well as the urging of the joint European solution.

It is indisputable that the German FDP, thrown out of parliament in 2013, reacted to the immigration crisis instantaneously. The party vigorously criticised Merkel's open-door policy, as they claim it violates the Rule of Law and the solidarity existing between EU Member States. At the same time the FDP still bolsters a liberal immigration policy, as they believe in a plural and multi-cultural society, but only if it is framed by explicit and transparent rules. It can be justifiably stated that as a result of the immigration crisis, the FDP has secured a place on the political map. They came up with a practical and confident proposal in the midst of the German domestic political chaos, including possibilities for the whole of the EU in their calculations and a number of their proposals were even adopted by the ALDE. Since the crisis, the party's popularity has been fluctuating between 5-8%, and given the FDP is able to stabilise this percentage, they are likely to be part of the Bundestag once again in 2017.

Western European parties in coalition governments (MR, Open VLD, Keskusta) faced a rather severe situation, but had every circumstance to propose liberal solutions in response to the problem. The proposal to create a safe countries list and/or to update the existing ones appears in most of these parties' statements, in an attempt to filter those immigrants who do not face life threatening conditions. Naturally, the Finnish were criticized for this, but at the same time it can be sensed that most parties endeavour to make the immigration process well regulated and executed according to specified rules, while their support seems to be quite stable percentage wise.

It deserves noting that quite a few liberal parties (Radikale Venstre, Keskusta, FDP, D66, Centerpartiet, Liberalerna) are keen on assigning municipalities key roles in the integration process, as according to them the problem of immigration cannot be solved on a central level. Therefore, this task must be tackled by smaller local communities, as the parties believe that language

tuition and setting foot in the labour market is more easily executed on a local level. Many parties see job vacancies as a real problem (Centerpartiet, Open VLD and earlier ANO), which could potentially be solved by regulated immigration, primarily confined to the EU.

Overall, it can be concluded that the immigration policies of European liberal parties are inclined towards becoming stricter; however, this was to be expected given the increased number of terror attacks across Europe, the inflation of financial strains and the surging popularity of extremist and populist parties. Nevertheless, the problems have not been resolved, and even at present crowds of refugees are travelling towards Europe, and therefore it can be affirmed that this topic will undoubtedly remain current for a long time to come.

II. THE REFUGEE CRISIS AND THE PARLIAMEN- TARY ELECTIONS IN SLOVAKIA

Géza Tokár

The Slovak parliamentary elections in 2016 were atypical in many aspects. The Slovak society and the political parties are traditionally focused on home affairs, but the refugee crisis in the summer and autumn of 2015 forced most of the subjects to concentrate on issues regarding national security and national identity. The purpose of this short study is to provide an overview of the refugee crisis in Slovak politics in the light of the parliamentary elections. Who was able to profit from the issue? Which party was gaining and losing due to the crisis? What was the public stance towards the migration? How can we evaluate the outcome of the election? These are the questions we are trying to find answers to. The main hypothesis of the study is that the refugee crisis in Slovakia in the light of the upcoming elections was rather seen as an opportunity to gain electoral support, not as a crisis event with moral obligations for the politicians. This was possible due to two reasons: first, Slovakia was not directly affected by the waves of migrants and refugees. Secondly, the Smer's ambition was to find a key issue before the campaign which was not reflecting to the unsolved, internal state-affairs and the opposition also struggled to find a key issue during the summer. As a result, politicians were rather reflecting the public opinion and prejudices against the immigrants, not trying to shape the public opinion in this matter.

Understanding the Slovak campaign slogans, events and putting them into the right context is important to create the bigger picture. In the first chapter we will identify the stance of the Slovak public towards the refugees, the Moslims and the minorities. It is also important to sum up, what was happened in Slovakia during the campaign – were there any immigrants in the country?

What kind of hot topics connected with refugees helped to shape the opinion of the political parties? What kind of official positions Slovakia formulated during this period? In the next part of the study we'll collect and summarize the main goals of the relevant Slovak parties regarding the migrants gathering the party programmes and official positions of party representatives. Trying to identify deeper motives behind the parties' strategies and evaluate the success of their approach is also part of the essay. Last but not least the ambition of the study is to provide a conclusion and make a few observations about the role of the refugee issue during the campaign.

Slovakia and the immigrants – a story of an isolated country

Slovakia found himself in a unique situation regarding the migrant crisis. The country itself is far from being ethnically homogenous, 8,5 percent of the population consists of Hungarians, the proportion of Roma population is unofficially between 2-8 percent. Despite this fact, Slovakia is a closed society with little tolerance to foreigners and this is the reason why Slovak political parties and politicians rather than shaping the society are trying to adapt their own ideology to the public demands and expectations. The foreigners are represented in small numbers in the Slovak society. According to the statistics the numbers of refugees, guest workers and immigrants are slowly raising during the last few decades, but the sheer numbers are still low. In the year 2014 in total 76 715 foreigners lived in Slovakia, 1,42 percent of the population. According to their nationality 26 157 was not a citizen of the European Union, 0,54 percent of the total population.²⁰ Comparing the member states of the European Union, only Poland, Romania and Bulgaria have lower proportion of immigrants. The numbers are low, but in comparison with the statistics from 2000 are still doubled – in the beginning of the 2000's only 28 801 foreigners lived in the country (0,53 percent of the total population).

20 Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 2014

Comparing the nationality of communities we can find out that the Czech, Hungarian, Romanian, Polish and German nationalities are overrepresented, besides them the Ukrainian, Serb, Russian, Vietnamese and Chinese communities are the biggest non-EU communities.²¹

Besides the small number of foreigners Slovakia is traditionally not a target country for asylum seekers. After the country became the member of the European Union a bigger wave of refugees hit the country, in 2004 11 395 individuals were registered. This number declined sharply during the next decade, before the refugee-crisis, in 2014 only 328 individuals were registered by the authorities, mainly from Afghanistan, Syria, Vietnam, Ukraine and Somalia.²² Between January and September of 2015 only 135 official applies for asylum were documented, while during the very same period Germany registered 292 770, Hungary 175 960, Sweden 72 985 asylum seekers.²³ The Slovak process of granting the refugee status is extremely slow, only 14 people received it in 2014 in addition to 99 further applicants with subsidiary protection status. In common there are two explanations to the general lack of refugees: the observers are pointing out that Slovakia is not a desired destination for the immigrants because it is unattractive in comparison with the western, richer and more developed democracies. The second argument is that most of the asylum-seekers are not even trying to start the application process while trying to leave to a country with a more sophisticated and flexible refugee policy. Slovakia's current migration policy is regulated by the Act on Residence of Aliens, which entered into force in January 2012.

According to social scientist Michal Vašečka Slovakia is being widely seen

21 Zahraničná migrácia v Slovenskej republike. Vývojové trendy od roku 2000. p. 13, available on: <http://www.iz.sk/download-files/sk/iom/sfpa-boris-divinsky-Zahranicna-migracia-v-Slovenskej-republike.pdf>.

22 Statistical overview of legal and illegal migration in Slovak Republic for the year 2014. Available at: <http://www.minv.sk/?rok-2014-1>.

23 Eurostat, Asylum and first time asylum applicants, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Asylum_quarterly_report

as a non-inclusive country which is not ready to handle the immigration through its official policies.²⁴ According to the statistics of MIPEX, Slovakian legislative is the 4th-5th backwards among the 28 member states of the European Union.

The position of the population on the issue of immigration is divided, at least. Shortly after joining the European Union the agency Focus realized a public opinion poll on the topic of immigration. The results showed certain inconsistency in Slovak positions regarding the asylum seekers. In total 72,6 percent of Focus's respondents claimed that the country should accommodate and help the asylum seekers, however 67,9 percent also stated that the refugees cost already too much money for the state budget. Nearly 65,8 percent agreed with the claim that asylum seekers are the carriers of various sicknesses and 51,4 percent claimed that the presence of immigrants is raising the level of crime. Another poll was made on 1053 respondents and three focus groups on October 2009, after the rate of asylum seekers was rapidly diminishing. The poll focused on perceiving the foreigners and different ethnicities in Slovakia in connection with tolerance and work-related migration. The results of this poll, surprisingly pointed out that the focus groups are treating immigrants better than „traditional” Slovak minorities but the different environments provide different results among a specialized group of eighth and ninth grader students.

Only²⁵ percent of the respondents were seeing the ethnic Hungarians positively in comparison with the negative answers (36,7 percent), in case of the Roma ethnic minority the proportion of positive respondents was 28,2 percent, 34 percent viewed the group rather or fully negatively. When asked

24 Integration of Migrants in the Slovak Politics, Zuzana Bargerová and Boris Divinsky, 2008

25 Postoje verejnosti k cudzincom a zahraničnej migrácii v Slovenskej republike (Michal Vašečka) IOM Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu, 2009

about the refugees, 45,4 percent expressed positive attitude, 39,7 percent was neutral and 14,9 percent of the respondents was rather negative. In case of Muslims, 46,1 percent saw the group in a positive light, ²⁶ percent neglected them with 27,9 percent of neutrals. This sympathy was however not based on personal experiences. Regarding the future of the country 15,5 percent of respondents hoped that Slovakia won't be interesting for foreigners and 12,9 percent believed that Slovak government should take measures to keep the number of foreigners on the current levels. 32,3 percent hoped the number of foreigners will stay the same naturally, 3,9 percent counted on rapid rise, 30 on slower rise of newcomers. The respondents were divided to three focus groups. Medium sized monoethnically Slovak towns tended to formulate the most expressive and negative statements, whereas the Bratislava focus group was the most open. In total, 63 percent of the respondents were thinking that the unsolved problems connected to the refugees will cause the strengthening of neo-Nazism. In opposition to 40 percent of respondents 47 percent claimed that politicians are afraid to solve problems with the immigrants because they fear the public opinion.

Within the poll the social scientists prepared interviews with various officials. Many respondents were criticizing the lacking Slovak institutional support. 'This country hasn't answered whether it wants immigration or not. (...) It is not clearly written if we do want immigration, where do we want it from and what are willing to do for it' - cited the poll one of the official respondents from the side of Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family. The only policy conception in this direction was worked out in 2005. Two more recent polls on the migration crisis and the public opinion were prepared during the election campaign. The first was made by Alexander Dubček University in Trnava during the migration crisis in autumn.²⁷ The public opinion poll veri-

26 Postoje verejnosti k cudzincom – vnímanie kultúrne odlišných skupín na Slovensku, 2009

27 Slovakia Fears Immigrants Are Not There available at <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/slovakia-fears-immigrants-not/>

fied that the Slovak public fears the surge of the Muslim community and mass migration. According to the poll makers 61,4 percent of respondents were thinking that refugees fleeing from the war should be given shelter, but not in Slovakia, 76,8 percent opposed the joint measures and 81,9 percent disagreed with the refugee quotas. Only 7,6 percent of the respondents expressed their belief that immigration is good for Slovakia. In comparison with the data from 2009 more than 75,5 percent of the respondents were convinced that immigration is raising crime rates, 70,6 percent resisted having immigrants as neighbors and 88,2 percent opposed building mosques in their region. The Focus prepared a similar public opinion poll in August, where turned out that more than 80 percent of the respondents disagree with receiving immigrants. In connection with the polls Vašečka claimed, the majority of the political actors is having difficulties in understanding the problem and differs only in the level of restrictions they are offering. “The elections can change into a dangerous and disgusting race of offering radical solutions” - pointed out the expert.²⁸

The refugee crisis in Slovakia – what exactly happened?

While evaluating the party positions in Slovakia regarding the immigrants and the refugee crisis it is important to take into consideration the political events in the country during the second half of 2015. There are two main reasons to do so: first of all, the political parties formulated their stance in the light of the events, sometimes directly reacting to the developments. Secondly, as we will see, the governing party, the Smer had no official agenda regarding the immigration (including a detailed party program). The Smer in connection with the issue relied mostly on the agenda of the prime minister and party president Robert Fico, who monopolized the government's com-

28 Utečenecká kríza môže ovplyvniť aj výsledky volieb available at <http://domov.sme.sk/c/7990591/utecenecka-kriza-moze-ovplyvniť-aj-vysledky-volieb.html>

munication on this matter. As a result by summing up Robert Fico's and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements we can also define the Smer's refugee policy.

Slovakia - the opposing force

As we could see in the previous chapter, the European migrant crisis, which started to culminate on the Balkans in June found Slovakia in an unusual situation. While the refugees were absent and the prejudices were present in the society, the government officials saw the crisis as an issue which can dominate the public in the next few months before the elections as the main agenda. While the Hungarian government announced the construction of a fence on the Serbian border, Robert Fico threatened to call a referendum in a reaction to the original EU plan for mandatory resettlement numbers.²⁹ In August the Slovak government formulated its main message – by declaring that Slovakia will voluntarily take part in the EU relocation process, but the country is willing to receive only 200 Syrian Christians. Interior ministry spokesman Ivan Netik said that Muslims would not be accepted because their community would not feel at home. “We want to really help Europe with this migration wave but... we are only a transit country and the people don't want to stay in Slovakia.” - commented Netik on the decision, who also pointed out that “We could take 800 Muslims but we don't have any mosques in Slovakia so how can Muslims be integrated if they are not going to like it here?”³⁰ The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs found himself in a difficult situation by trying to balance the prime minister's message. Miroslav Lajčák, foreign minister and deputy prime minister claimed to Politico in an interview that “You cannot turn into a multi-cultural society overnight”³¹. According to him

29 Immigration Dispute Splits Leaders at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-immigration-dispute-splits-leaders-1435326764>

30 Migrants crisis: Slovakia 'will only accept Christians' available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33986738>

31 Slovakia defends its closed doors on migration available at <http://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-closed-doors-migration-refugees-relocation-quota/>

“The political leaders in Slovakia respond to the feelings and expectations of the Slovak citizens, and for me as a foreign minister, this is very difficult because I don’t remember any other issue where our national position — which is really built on the feelings of people — has been so much in contrast with what is expected of us from our partners.” Slovakia was an active member of the Visegrad four participation in European Union talks about migrant quotas and measures in this direction. “I’m really disappointed that instead of discussing these issues and these are real issues – we are being labelled as not understanding the solidarity — not being European, not deserving of membership in the European Union, and we are being threatened with not getting the future funds – pointed out Lajčák. Fico on October 2015 claimed that the Slovak state is prepared to build a fence on the Slovak-Hungarian border. “If other methods of protecting the borders fail, it could come to physical defense. The migration crisis can be managed only if we will protect the Schengen borders. We are not allowing illegal migration and we will separate economic migrants and people in need of help” - stated the prime minister.³² “We are not talking about fences but certain barriers which are able to deter migrants from the most risky places. The barrier prevents moving through the borders and directs refugees to places in which the border control can be made” - justified the fence Róbert Kaliňák, the minister of interior³³. In addition to the homeland activities on August 25 Slovak soldiers arrived to the Hungarian borders to provide help patrolling the border to Serbia.

Slovakia was not enthusiastic with the idea of mandatory quotas suggested by the European Union. Fico on 30th September, after approving the plan of relocation promised to take legal action at the European Court of Justice. According to the plans Slovakia was to receive 802 migrants in 2015 regard-

32 Fico: Slovensko postaví bariéry, ak zlyhá ochrana Schengenu available at: <http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/372233-fico-slovensko-postavi-bariery-ak-zlyha-ochrana-schengenu/>

33 Fico chystá na migrantov plot ako v Iraku, kritizujú ho osobnosti aj eurosocialisti available at: <https://dennikn.sk/381423/fico-chysta-migrantov-plot-kritizuju-ho-osobnosti-aj-eurosocialisti/>

ing asylum or defense of the 120,000 asylum seekers. Slovakia was strongly opposing the idea alongside the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania. The lawsuit was filed on 2nd of December and as a result, Slovakia symbolically became the leading nation among the opposers of the quotas. The majority Slovakia's MEP's mostly opposed the quotas in an interesting combination: Richard Sulík (SaS), Jana Žitňanská (NOVA) and Branislav Škripek (OLANO) voted against, Monika Flašíková-Beňová (Smer), Miroslav Mikolášik (KDH), József Nagy (Most-Híd), Boris Zala (Smer) and Vladimír Maňka (Smer) supported the decision, while Pál Csáky (SMK), Eduard Kukan (SDKÚ), Monika Smolková (Smer), Pál Csáky (SMK) and Anna Záborská (KDH) abstained.

In March, during the last days of the campaign Robert Fico gave his most vigorous speech against the immigrants on one of the Smer's last election rallies. The prime minister promised to build a border fence with Austria and Hungary to stop invaders from entering Germany, and also announced that his country would "never accept a single Muslim." This claim was made on one of Fico's other claims, namely the "EU border was so full of holes it resembled a piece of Swiss cheese."³⁴ "We'll never bring even a single Muslim to Slovakia; we won't create any Muslim communities here because they pose a serious security risk" - claimed Fico and pointed out that Slovakia would "never bow to the European Union's dictates and accept quotas." Fico also claimed the German secret service's information revealed possible terrorists from the Islamic State among the migrants. Fico also referred to the mass sexual attacks by the non-white invaders in Cologne and said that he would "not accept the creation of a compact, closed Muslim community in Slovakia that would be a huge threat to the European way of life." Fico also announced that Slovakia would be building fences on its borders with Austria and Hungary to "prevent alternative escape routes through Slovakia and the Czech

34 Slovakia : Schengen borders are like Swiss cheese, Available at: <https://uknews24blog.wordpress.com/2016/03/05/slovakia-schengen-borders-are-like-swiss-cheese/>

Republic to Germany.”

The anti-immigrant communication of the Slovak government was partially balanced by the president of the country, the unaffiliated Andrej Kiska. Kiska opposed refugee quotas, but has also expressed numerous times the need for humanity and moral integrity in the issue in the parliament and the press.

“Civic” movements during the campaign – extremists, public protests and the Gabčíkovo-issue

The outcome of refugee crisis in Slovakia was not limited to declarations about the refugee quotas; certain civic movements and local issues were also influencing the public opinion and the debate before the elections. The extremists were unusually active during the summer and the autumn period of 2015 by organizing local anti-Muslim protests, the re-opening of the refugee camp in Gabčíkovo caused upset in the southern regions of Slovakia (affecting the policy of Most-Híd among others).

Slovakia faced the migration crisis with three main facilities operated for the refugees - in Rohovce, Opatovská Nová Ves and Humenné. According to the previous experiences with the migration on the Slovak-Ukrainian non-Schengen border, the controlling organs and the biggest refugee centers were based in the eastern regions of the country. In connection with the migration crisis however, the Ministry of Interior decided to reopen the camp in Gabčíkovo (Bős), which was closed in 2009. According to the official explanation the camp's location was the deciding factor in the decision, since the village is close to the Austrian border. In reality, the village is isolated from Austria because of the presence of the local water-plant and it is inhabited by ethnic Hungarians – a community, where Smer had no significant support,

thus received minimal loss of potential voters. The basis of the Austrian-Slovak cooperation from July was a long-time agreement about taking temporal care of 500 refugees arriving to Austria until 2017.

The local protests were immediate after the decision was made public. On August 2 the local mayor Iván Fenes (SMK) organized a referendum about reopening the camp. The turnout ratio was 58 percent, 96 percent of the voters expressed their disagreement with the reopening. Despite the non-mandatory result, the Slovak authorities decided to ignore the outcome of the local elections and opened the facility anyway. The first 24 refugees from Syria arrived in September; the camp was in use for the next months.

The developments around the camp were met with criticism of the opposition parties and political movements. The most intense reaction came from the Slovak and Hungarian extremist organizations. Marián Kotleba and the LSNS party planned a protest against the local camp on September 1; however, the authorities closed the roads leading to the village due to a „practice of voluntary firefighters and medics.” This hasn’t prevented Kotleba’s organization from executing a second event on the village on September 3 in unlikely cooperation with the Hungarian radical Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom and the far right Jobbik’s youth organization. There were no incidents connected with the local protest.³⁵

Slovak parties also reacted to the events connected with the reopening of the refugee camp. The nationalist SNS expressed his sympathy with the local citizens, the right-wing SDKÚ stressed the importance of the local voice and the liberal SaS emphasized that any decision made on a local referendum should be respected by the government which communicated in an unfor-

35 Bőszön a HVIM, a Jobbik és helyi lakosok tüntettek available at <http://parameter.sk/content/boson-hvim-jobbik-es-helyi-lakosok-tuntettek-fotok>

tunate way. Most-Híd's president Béla Bugár expressed his lack of surprise about the result. According to him the lack of communication from the side of the officials was a mistake, the government's viewing of the immigrants as a potential security risk further worsened the situation. Bugár thought that the government is stranded and has to work out a solution which is simultaneously respecting the locals' decision and fulfilling the agreement with the Austrian authorities.

The SMK as a party most heavily involved in the case (due to their local preferences) was similarly pointing out that the Ministry of Interior was deciding about reopening the camp in Gabčíkovo without consultation with the local authorities. The SMK believed that the decision created a contingency for the villages of southern Slovakia due to the proximity of the water plant to the refugee camp. The SMK also pointed out that many similar facilities are nearly empty in Slovakia and there is no direct cause of reopening an old camp. The Ministry of Interior published only a brief press release in which it emphasized that „Slovakia is accepting only 100 Syrian Christians and the government is leading diplomatic war to avoid the quotas from Brussels.”

Besides the issue of Gabčíkovo, the refugee topic was visible in the Slovak public due to the mass protests organised by the extremist People's Party-Our Slovakia (LSNS). On June 20 more than 140 people have been arrested in Bratislava where thousands gathered for the protest and the march turned violent. In addition to the protests in the capital, further events were held in bigger Slovak cities such as Košice and Trnava.

Refugees and political parties – who said, what?

Smer – with the help of the government, without guidelines

Smer is considering himself as a party with social-democratic values; however, this stance was not visible during the immigration crisis. In reality, if one would have to judge the Smer's position on immigration, it would be greatly difficult to do so just by reading the party program before the elections. The Smer had no written agenda on the issue of refugees – in fact the party hasn't specified their main goals before the election. The governing party's only collection of ideas was a very short summary consisting of five directives and five sentences connected to them. The document published on January 18 was called "Program priorities SMER-SD for the years 2016-2020" and described the main goals of the party with only a few short sentences. Immigrants were not directly mentioned in this short document, however Smer promised a "secure state."³⁶ Besides this summary and three social packages passed in the parliament as the only governing party, Smer had no written promises.

Despite the lack of political agenda, Smer was able to control the political Smer is considering himself as a party with social-democratic values; however, this stance was not visible during the immigration crisis. In reality, if one would have to judge the Smer's position on immigration, it would be greatly difficult to do so just by reading the party program before the elections. The Smer had no written agenda on the issue of refugees – in fact the party hasn't specified their main goals before the election. The governing party's only collection of ideas was a very short summary consisting of five directives and five sentences connected to them. The document published on January 18 was

³⁶ The document can be found on the link <http://strana-smer.sk/priority-programu-strany-smer-sd-pre-roky-2016-2020-0>

called “Program priorities SMER-SD for the years 2016-2020” and described the main goals of the party with only a few short sentences. Immigrants were not directly mentioned in this short document, however Smer promised a “secure state.” Besides this summary and three social packages passed in the parliament as the only governing party, Smer had no written promises.

Despite the lack of political agenda, Smer was able to control the political discussions through Robert Fico and his official positions regarding the refugee crisis, the security of the country and the social packages. “Fico has an unlikely political background to be in the position in which he finds himself today. A former member of the Communist Party, the 51-year-old and his party were always regarded as center-left on the political spectrum. The invasion issue has however become pivotal for him, most likely because Slovakia has some other pressing internal problems which would otherwise have created severe political problems for the ruling party.”³⁷ - described the News Observer the issues the governing party was focusing on.

Fico himself was using the sharpest words in the final phase of the campaign. In the Smer’s last election rally he pointed out that “The only way to eliminate risks like Paris (terrorist assault) and Germany (the Cologne incident) is to prevent the creation of a compact Muslim community in Slovakia.”³⁸ Fico also promised in the rally “monitoring of every single Muslim” in the country and openly admitted that “Slovak citizens and their security are of higher priority than the rights of migrants.” According to him the security threat for Slovaks is “immensely high.”

37 Slovakia to Build Border Fence available at <http://newobserveronline.com/slovakia-build-border-fence/>

38 Slovakia : Schengen borders are like Swiss cheese, Available at: <https://uknews24blog.wordpress.com/2016/03/05/slovakia-schengen-borders-are-like-swiss-cheese/>

In conclusion the refugee crisis was an important topic for the Smer during the election campaign. Robert Fico as a prime minister and as a president of the party formulated strong statements about the immigrants and the Muslim community; other party members were less involved in the process – only as government officials and representatives. Nevertheless, Smer's strategy was very fragile and vulnerable – from January the protests of teachers and nurses changed the course of the campaign. This was possible due to the citizen's preferences. Eurobarometer already pointed out in November that the main concerns of the population included unemployment, the economy, health care and the cost of living rather than immigration. According to this poll only 6 percent of Slovaks listed terrorism as one of their top two concerns.³⁹ As a result, Smer was weakened after the election and was forced to form a four-party government.

Sloboda and Solidarita (SaS) – fighting in Bratislava, Brussels and Berlin

Sloboda and Solidarita (also known as SaS or Freedom and Solidarity) is considered to be a centre-right liberal political party which in reality is much closer to civil libertarianism with focus on economic issues. Before the 2016 elections the SaS was widely seen as a party which will have serious difficulties by reaching the five percent threshold. The party lost a few members during the last election period and had only a few assets at its disposal: the most important of them was Richard Sulík, the president of the liberals. Sulík was elected as a MEP but he is not member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, rather the Conservatives and Reformist group in Brussels. The president had numerous duties in the EP and Bratislava and he was the most visible member of the party in the international community – because

39 'We protect Slovakia' available at <http://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-fico-migrants-refugees-asylum-crisis-smer-election/>

of his native German language knowledge and his reputation as a frequent and loud critic of European Union integration process.

As a part of his criticism of European processes Sulík was setting up the basics of the SaS's agenda on immigrants on April, 2013. At that time, Sulík published an article⁴⁰ in which he pointed out that immigrants are already representing a „huge problem” in Great Britain and shortly will be an issue in the European Union as well. The politician claimed that as Milton Friedman previously stated, no true social state can maintain the free flow of immigrants into the country.

In the spirit of Sulík's previous statements the SaS was dealing with the issue of immigration in a separate chapter within its own party program called “Border defence and refugee politics.” “It is a right thing to be humane and sympathize with the war refugees and their family. On the other hand, however, solidarity cannot be forced. In that case it ceases to be solidarity, it becomes a dictate and its purpose is to carrying out orders of someone else” - the party argues in the document. The Freedom and Solidarity stresses that every country needs to keep the rules within his own borders, guard them and implement effective legal tools to defend its integrity. The party claims that everyone has the right to live where they want to and where they see it as the most suitable for them. This law cannot be denied, but even so, every country has the right to decide, whom he allows to enter and set the rules of living in its own territory.

The SaS claims that Slovakia has to be prepared to defend their borders, even considering shutting it down, if necessary. Keeping national sovereignty in Brussels and maintaining freedom in taking similar measurements is also

40 Imigranti a Európska únia – zaujímavé fakty available at <http://europskaunia.sulik.sk/imigranti-europska-unia-fakty/>

a key concept. The SaS considers a temporary solution of migration crisis in setting up and maintaining centralized refugee camps beyond the territory of the European Union (North Africa, the Balkans, Turkey) and finance them from European sources. Illegal immigrants should be relocated to these camps; refugees can start the asylum process or leave the camps and return to their homeland. The SaS is strongly opposing the quotas; regarding the placement of migrants considers voluntary and local solidarity as the key factors. “I am against the quotas for various reasons. First, Slovakia is unable to integrate even 200 000 own citizens who are living in ghettos, mostly Romas. Second, the European Commission cannot decide about the numbers how many refugees can one country take.” - said Richard Sulík in a summer interview.⁴¹ “There is a definitely real risk that among the refugees are also the warriors of the Islamic State (...) we have to deal with the immigrants, not by applying death penalty: one of the available options is to close the southern border” - stressed Sulík, who also claimed that Frontex, the agency which promotes, coordinates and develops European border management should work with a bigger budget.

“I have a feeling that hundreds of MP’s in the European Parliament are living in a bubble which isolates them from real problems. They are solving symptoms not the causes. The arriving refugees are a symptom, the cause of their arrival is that Northern Africa is destabilized” - Sulík told *EuropskeNoviny.sk*. Other politicians of the SaS were much less visible in connection with the refugee crisis. Martin Poliačik attended a debate with Robert Kaliňák about the issue but hasn’t formed a distinctive opinion about possible solutions. To sum up, Richard Sulík and the SaS was being able to identify immigration as a potential hot topic before the election. The ambition of the party was

40 Sulík: Som proti kvótam na migrantov, nedokážeme integrovat ani Rómov available at <https://europskenoviny.sk/2015/06/15/richard-sulik-som-proti-kvotam-na-migrantov-nedokazeme-integrovat-ani-romov/>

however not to support the refugees, rather provide a viable alternative to the right-wing, Fico-opposing voters who also disagreed with the quotas. During the campaign Sulík was trying to define himself as an alternative to Robert Fico, a politician who is respected in western countries as MEP with strong personal opinion on European issues. As a result, the SaS was able to exceed the expectations.

Most-Híd – a story of an unsuccessful alternative

The Most-Híd is an interesting subject in the Slovak party stage. The party defines itself occasionally as liberal, its political positions are changing between centre and centre-right, is a member of the conservative European People's Party in the European Parliament. The party positions regarding various issues are usually well documented, just like the stance regarding immigration. The Most-Híd's party program prepared for the 2016 election is unique in that way that it was formed during a lengthy process in the previous two years. As a result the "Civic vision 2016" sets up numerous goals for various topics from culture to education and economy. At the same time, the issues connected with the immigration are not covered in the document, because the refugee crisis was not part of the political discussions while creating the program. In the end, Most-Híd hasn't officially proclaimed its position towards the immigrants, and managed to flexibly change its stance during the election campaign. We can identify two phases regarding the party's immigration policy. The first period from the summer of 2015 until November can be defined as an era of intense communication regarding the issue. During these few months the Most-Híd's primary ambition was to direct a refugee-friendly, liberal message towards younger, liberal audience. The second phase, from November until the elections (and the present day) can be characterized by much less exposure, ignoring the topic of immigration and emphasizing the importance of a "secure state".

The Most-Híd used two main platforms to communicate – in the European Parliament by the MEP of the party, József Nagy and in the press, where the Slovak branch of the party took over the communication (mostly by Lucia Žitňanská, former member of SDKÚ and Martin Dubéci, former expert of Siet). The Slovak messages of the Most-Híd were dominantly pro-immigrant, while the Hungarian communication of the party was somewhat different, concentrated mostly on avoiding the topic.

The first official article about the immigration was written by Žitňanská. The latter Minister of Justice claimed that “Some politicians forget that the migrants are people too”, emphasizing the call for solidarity as a reaction to the refugee crisis. After the referendum in Gabčíkovo Béla Bugár, the president of the party blamed the government’s bodies for misinforming local inhabitants in connection with the re-opened refugee camp. The presidency of the Most-Híd formulated a joint statement towards the public in connection with the issue of the immigrants on 3rd September of 2015. The party was expressing deep discomfort with “the signs of hatred and human profitmongering which is accompanying the emerging humanitarian crisis in Europe”. The key message Most-Híd formulated was that solidarity and responsibility are not excluding each other.⁴²

Just two weeks later Most-Híd published another statement regarding the Fico’s government’s stance regarding the quotas and the threats of closing the Slovak borders. The Híd was disturbed by the “unconstructive and reluctant approach” of the Slovak government regarding the quota issue. The party prepared a video on immigrants on October in which claimed, the problems need to be solved there, where they were formed.

42 Key elements of party communication are collected on site <http://www.most-hid.sk/sk/tags/utecenci> respectively <http://www.most-hid.sk/hu/search/node/menek%C3%BCltek>

In sharp contrast with the previous, active approach, Most-Híd hasn't published another statement during the election campaign until March. Lucia Žitňanská was seen on billboards emphasizing the importance of a secure state, the open criticism of Fico's government visibly stopped. There are two possible explanations of this phenomenon. The first reason is the problematic reception of Híd's communication by the public, particularly among the Hungarian target audience. József Nagy claimed in Nitra in a presentation towards local university students that "migrants can populate deserted villages"⁴³, which was heavily advertised by the political opponents of the party. Béla Bugár and members of Most-Híd were openly criticized for their pro-immigrant viewpoint in campaign meetings. As a result, party analysts came into conclusion that the Most-Híd loses more than gains with the pro-immigrant approach. The second reason for stopping the communication in this direction is purely political: the autumn public opinion polls affirmed that the right-wing opposition has practically no chance of success in the upcoming elections and the Smer will be involved in the next government. Most-Híd was trying to maximize its coalition-forming potential and stopped formulating strong anti-government messages to overcome possible obstacles in coalition negotiations.

In conclusion, Most-Híd was the only party which openly defended immigrants during the first phase of the Slovak election campaign. The political circumstances however changed this strategy. As a result Most-Híd ignored the topic in the last few months of the campaign and abandoned the pro-immigrant, humanitarian rhetoric. The party's result was weaker than expected and in the end the Most-Híd formed a coalition with the openly anti-immigrant Smer, the nationalist SNS and the Siet'.

43 Source article missing from bumm.sk, interpretation available at <http://felvidek.ma/2015/11/a-most-hid-kozep-es-del-szlovakiaba-telepitene-a-migransokat/>

Siet' – too afraid to take a stand

Before the Slovak elections in 2016 Siet' was seen as the most hopeful party on the right side of the political spectrum. The main goal of Radoslav Procházka's formation was to form an alternative to Robert Fico as the leading party of the opposition. Procházka, a former Christian-democrat politician and a lawyer led an unsuccessful campaign for presidency in 2015, however his main goal was to lay the foundation of a new party which can attract the disillusioned right-wing voters. The base principles of the Siet' were worked out by a think-tank/NGO called Alfa which prepared a program and a prospective strategy for the new party. Unfortunately, similarly to the strategy of Most-Híd, Siet was preparing his program in the long run - as a result, the principles formulated in Alfa were not covering the refugee crisis and the party had no written basis of official communication on the topic. In the summer of 2015 the Siet faced the dilemma of reacting to the immigrant-issue and gave a more cautious (and in the long run more devastating) answer than the Most-Híd: ignoring the problem.

The party chose to remain silent, de facto giving legitimacy to the official government policy. The stance of the party presidency caused disturbance within the party system. As a result, Martin Dubéci, Radoslav Procházka's right hand, visionary and director of the Alfa left the think-tank and joined the Most-Híd. "Politicians are unable to overcome themselves in the light of the recent humanitarian crisis. They cannot step out of their own shadow and do something, what is completely normal and decent" - explained Dubéci the reason of his leaving.⁴⁴

44 Source Netýka sa to Siete ako takej, ale celej politickej scény, možno s výnimkou Mosta-Híd. Politici vo svetle akútnej humanitárnej krízy nie sú schopní prekonať samých seba, vystúpiť zo svojho tieňa a urobiť niečo, čo je v takejto situácii, akú vidíme v Rakúsku a Maďarsku, absolútne normálne a pričítané.

One of the few visible statements of Siet' regarding the matter of immigrants came on 22nd of September. The party published a joint statement connected with the issue of refugees. According to the Siet' it is vital to "stay on the right side of history." The party pressed the importance of having a united voice in the issue on a country level, warned of the danger of dividing the country along the topic of refugees. Siet' asked the president, Andrej Kiska to organize a roundtable of "relevant" Slovak parties and decide on a "national consensus" on how to deal with the waves of immigrants and the most pressing issues connected with the refugees. The statement caused no reaction at the president's office.

To sum up the position of the Siet' we can determine that Radoslav Procházka's party was unable to formulate an individual, strong opinion regarding this topic. The Siet' was losing his experts as a result of this unwillingness and in the end it turned out that passivity was not rewarded by voters – the Siet' barely got into the parliament and in the end made a coalition with the governing Smer, the SNS and the Most-Híd. The party was also unable and unwilling to communicate its opinion in other matters. In the time of writing this analysis the party lost its supporters, the majority of its MPs and most probably its place in coalition.

SNS – Defending the state borders from an invasion

The Slovak National Party started the 2016 election campaign as a non-parliamentary party. The principles of the SNS were defined and laid by Ján Slota, known about his vulgar, xenophobic and ultra-nationalist comments. Slota, however, was removed from presidency and the party in 2013. His successor, Andrej Danko took a slightly different, more moderate approach by trying to address a wider audience. This ambition was visible from his personal approach, less unambiguous from party program.

The SNS voiced the need of defending the country numerous times in the past. The defensive aspect was not as dominant and visible in the party communication before the 2016 elections: Andrej Danko probably realized that he cannot offer an alternative to Robert Fico's sharp statements, however wanted to provide an alternative to the Smer's disillusioned voters. The issue of immigration and the topics connected to this subject are mentioned in the detailed party program.

According to the SNS the Slovak Republic creates conditions for all individuals to prove their skills – thus prevents immigration. The SNS placed emphasis on “consequent defence” of Slovak state borders to prevent massive and uncontrollable “invasion of illegal immigrants” taking into consideration Slovakia's membership in the European Union and being part of the Schengen area.

The SNS's ambition was to control the flow of refugees by creating centres of first contact. The party argued, the state measure is necessary to defend the “health and security” of Slovak citizens, helping the real refugees.” The Slovak National Party ambioned protecting the country from “so called economic migrants and the infiltration of international terrorist cells” and also wanted to create a special force to eliminate “international extremism and terrorism in the territory of Slovakia”. The party formulated another task for the state which is defending the rights of Slovak citizens from any kind of disturbance of their “Slovak ethnic, cultural, religious and social integrity from the side of illegal immigrants who are coming from different ethnic, cultural, religious and social environment.”

In comparison with the Smer, the SNS as a non-parliamentary party that managed to avoid getting to the frontline of the discussion about refugees

and immigrants. This is the main reason why the party looked like a seemingly more acceptable, less confrontative alternative of Robert Fico's immigrant policy. The party managed to gain fifteen seats after the elections, the result was legitimating Danko's strategy.

OLaNO – Fight against corruption beyond fight against refugees

Igor Matovič's OLaNO (Ordinary People and Independent Personalities) is a not cohesive party by professional standards: the movement consists of several individuals and civil activists with stronger or weaker attachment to the party leader. However, the OLANO is undergoing a party building reform which is visible at least because the movement was able to create a more detailed program with common goals and points than in 2012.

The party's public strategy is based as much on Igor Matovič's statements as on the program. During the campaign Matovič exposed himself rather as a leader against corruption and Robert Fico than a politician who wants to define himself in connection with the refugee crisis. As a result, the OLANO was rather silent regarding the topic of immigrants – and the goals of the party resemble the Smer's official directions.

“We are aware of the fear of Slovak citizens from the presence of a huge group of immigrants in our territory. The vast part of the immigrants is considering the Central European region as a transit-station on their way to western parts of the continent” - claims the OLANO in the official program. According to the party the discussion about the topic can be lengthy, finding a solution is not an easy process and requires complex measures. The solution has to be based on mutual solidarity – the refugees need to submit the local habits and laws; respect the culture and integrity of the European states. “They need to

understand that life in Europe besides great advantages bears great responsibility” - points out the OLANO. The party believes that Europe can't accept the exploitation of its social system, the erosion of the foundations of European civilization. The party wants to initiate an interreligious and intercultural dialogue in cooperation with religious and civil organizations. The OLANO also supports the idea of creating refugee camps outside of the territory of European Union.

The OLANO also published a joint statement on September 10 in connection with the refugee crisis and closing the borders. The movement pointed out that Robert Fico as a prime minister should make a difference between refugees and economical migrants but also denied the quotas which are opposing the idea of solidarity and subsidiarity. The party wanted to use the help of non-governmental organizations and the church to help the endangered religious groups but also suggested tightening the law and allowing the state offices to revoke asylum in case of committing crime.

During the campaign OLANO was mainly focusing on other topics than immigrants: the corruption of the state and the scandals of the Smer were being considered a more important topic than the refugee crisis. Regarding the immigrants the solutions suggested by Igor Matovič's party fell in line with other conceptions. The party campaign was successful mostly because of deviating from the standard communication and issues of their rivals.

LSNS – against parasites and refugees

Before the elections very few political analysts would have predicted that Marian Kotleba and his far-right extremist movement, the LSNS (People's Party - Our Slovakia) might get into the parliament. The majority of the elec-

tion forecasts counted on Kotleba's parliamentary absence despite the fact that the movement was active and visible in the campaign – most of the time in connection with the immigrants. Kotleba, who was well-known for his anti-EU and anti-NATO rhetoric, expanded the group of their enemies by the refugee quotas and the migrants themselves.

The movement and the connected smaller organisations were able to organise mildly successful local protests. “Migrants have, in a certain sense, become the new Roma for the Eastern European far-right,” said Tomáš Nociar, a political scientist studying the far-right at Bratislava's Comenius University in connection with the crisis.⁴⁵

Kotleba formulated a few strong statements in the mass demonstrations. In June 20th several thousand demonstrators were protesting against the “islamization” of Slovakia which was the biggest extremist happening in the country for the last decade. Following the demonstration a couple of hundred participants were rioting in the town. “Our moral obligation is not to care about immigrants but our own children, nation and the state” - stated Kotleba in the protest and accused the United State and its politics in the Middle East and Africa of creating the wave of immigrants. “Europe and Slovakia are in a situation in which even one immigrant is too much. We are unable to secure jobs for our own people, the state doesn't care about our children and we are pulling foreigners into the country?” - asked Kotleba on the rally. The LSNS had no detailed party program, but it formulated a special type of “ten commandments”, which is not dealing strictly with migration issues, only mentioning the possibility of strict workforce control.

The results of the election showed that Kotleba's strategy to mobilize his supporters was visible and above all very effective. The LSNS gained 8,04 percent

45 Migrantí jsou pro střední Evropu „novými Romy“ available at http://www.rozhlas.cz/plus/svet/_zprava/migranti-jsou-pro-stredni-evropu-novymi-romy--1601256

and although isolated and occasionally demanded to be banned, it will be most probably a parliamentary party for the next four years.

Sme Rodina – Immigrants are not our family

Media celebrity Boris Kollár's Sme Rodina (We Are Family) movement and its success at the elections is one of the most hardly explainable phenomena in the Slovak politics. The leader of the party was able to mobilize the frustrated voters despite the fact that he had no party programme; he lacked experienced advisors and had no interpretable promises. Kollár claimed numerous times that "he is not a politician" and he is not willing to make similar promises as the traditional political parties – besides that claim he made no attempt to clarify what exactly he wants to achieve in politics. However, if we compare the written program of Kollár's Sme Rodina to the other parties documents, we can discover that it is a collection of foggy statements, prejudices and inadmissible statements.

The Sme Rodina is dedicating considerable space to the issue of immigrants. According to the party programme the "biggest security threat for Slovakia is the uncontrollable flow of illegal immigrants to Europe. The flow of population is comparable to the 'wandering of the nations' which in the past lead to fall of civilizations like the ancient Rome." The movement claims that if the state makes a "mistake" in this area it will take "hundreds of years" to correct it.

According to the Sme Rodina's credo the "millions" arriving to Europe have different habits and they are unwilling to adapt – as a consequence of this behaviour conflicts are emerging in France and Germany. "In Slovakia we have hundreds of years of experience with the Roma. Their population is growing and we hardly can manage the problems with coexistence. It is easy to

imagine, how big those problems should be, if the Roma were also Muslims” - states the program. The Sme Rodina claims that even if some individuals are willing to integrate into society, a bigger group is unwilling to do so, and the supporters of the Islamic State want to destroy the civilization.

“We can’t accommodate everyone, but we can help those, who want to improve their conditions of living at home” - states the Sme Rodina and claims, that the party is refusing refugee quotas and supports creating fences next to the borders in times of crisis.

The practically unknown Sme Rodina performed unexpectedly well in the elections gaining 6,6 percent of the votes. The popularity of Kollár’s movement can partially be explained with general frustration, overrepresentation of protest voters and the party chairman’s showman personality. However, Kollár is isolated in the parliament, just like Marián Kotleba.

KDH – Silence and moral obligation

The KDH is one of Slovakia’s most stable parties with longer history; the Christian democrats were part of the parliament from the 90’s. The KDH was not making confronting statements during the campaign about the refugee crisis and was practically invisible during this period. The relative inactivity of the movement can be justified with the special connection to the Catholic Church. The church was not openly refusing the migrants and even tried to convey their problems to the members.⁴⁶

The issue of immigration is an organic part of the party program. The KDH believes that massive migration is one of the most serious challenges for Eu-

46 More in link <http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/368402-katolicka-cirkev-na-slovensku-chce-pomoc-utecencom-vratane-ubytovania/>

rope. “Europe has the moral obligation to help those who are ridden and hungry” - claims the party. The Christian democrats also express that the European Union has to make a difference among those, who have and have not the right to this kind of help. Those, who are being accommodated, need to adapt to the local conditions. The KDH is urging short- and long term solutions, like helping those who are suffering as close to their home, as possible. The party wants to strengthen the control of the Schengen borders and seeks provisions against human trafficking, urges elimination of war conflicts and working out a complex solution to the migration in cooperation with every member state of the European Union.

The KDH expects from the refugees that the asylum-seekers in Slovakia be willing to learn Slovak language, respect the constitution, human rights, the equality of man and women, the local traditions and culture. The party wants to avoid creation of “ghettos and parallel societies”

The KDH, struggling with long-term credibility underperformed in the elections and for the first time in its history was unable to reach the threshold.

SMK – A campaign based on a camp

The SMK, also known as MKP (Party of the Hungarian Community) is the party of ethnic Hungarians which was struggling to reach the threshold during the last eight years. Before the elections of 2016 the party partially reformulated its strategy and concentrated on mobilization. One of the key election issues was fuelled by the refugee crisis, hence the party organised a state-wide petition campaign on October.

The petition had two main objectives. First of them was an initiative to modify the legal regulations regarding the local referendums. The SMK had two reasons to ask for this – the referendum organised in Gabčíkovo as a protest to the reopened refugee camp and a similarly ignored referendum in Tešedíkovo about changing the name of the village to the historic version – Pered. The petition's secondary demand was to oppose the mandatory refugee quotas. The initiative fell in line with the official policy of the Fidesz, the SMK's most important foreign partner.

The SMK after six months of active campaigning managed to gather 79798 signatures, thus the petition became the most successful mass initiative of the last two decades. The Slovak authorities however haven't provided an official answer to the addressed issues. The petition can be evaluated instead of a political agenda rather as a tool to mobilize the Hungarian society before the election.

In contradiction with the petition the issue of the immigrants is far less dominant in the party program. The document is viewing migration as a “very pressing” issue, but no solutions and suggestions are the part of it. The refugee crisis is mentioned in the context of competencies of European Union member state and as a challenge for the state security.

Despite the campaign of the SMK heavily relied on mobilization in connection with the refugee crisis, it was not effective according to the numbers. The SMK gained 4,04 percent of the votes in the elections and remained a non-parliamentary party with strong regional organizations.

Conclusion – refugee crisis and political crisis

While most of the time we can hardly judge the real efficiency of various party policies, during the elections the situation is somewhat different: the results provide a prompt picture about the parties and the real support of their policies. Immigration was one, but not the only key issue of the elections: Robert Fico and the Smer's communication relied heavily on the topic, but in the beginning of 2016 various civic movements warned about the problems connected with education, healthcare and general corruption. Smer's election agenda was focused mostly on immigration, the party was unable to react to other issues. As a result, Smer was weakened and the results of the Slovak election proved, no party can be successful with a single-issue agenda. The SMK's underachievement can be justified with similar argumentation: focusing on one issue can backfire.

Despite the relatively bad results of the Smer we can't pronounce that the refugee crisis played little or no role in Slovak elections: Sulík's SaS and Kotleba's LSNS (and partly Kollár's We Are Family) both overachieved despite actively communicating their dissatisfaction with the European Union's migration policy. These parties however both positioned themselves also as an alternative of Smer's four year government besides communicating about refugee-policies. Igor Matovic and the OLANO was also an election overachiever despite the fact that the refugees played little to no role in their campaign activities, the passive Christian-democrat KDH and Siet however produced disappointing results with a similar strategy.

The Most-Híd underachieved as well; it is questionable whether this phenomenon was caused by party inconsistency regarding the immigration or the damage done by visible „pro-immigrant” statements during the summer

of 2016. Not a single party, including the „liberal” parties of SaS and Most-Híd was able to maintain a consistent, pro-immigrant position during the whole election campaign in Slovakia. It will remain an open question, what would have happened if one of the parties would have been able to do so. If there is a main message, what we can derive from the results of the Slovak parliamentary elections, it is this: it's hard to formulate a positive message regarding the issue of the immigrants in Slovakia. However, formulating a credible negative message is also difficult due to the dire competition. Nevertheless, no party can ignore social issues before the elections, especially if the public is dissatisfied with the overall position of the given state. The topic of refugees can temporarily divert the political discussion in a country, but it is not enough to win an election.

Table 1
Outcome of the Slovak parliamentary elections, 2016

Party name	Position on migration	Immigration a key issue?	2012 results (seats)	2016 results (seats)	Over/underachiever
Smer	negative	yes	44,4 (83)	28,28 (49)	under
SaS	negative	yes	5,9 (11)	12,1 (21)	over
OLANO	negative	no	8,55 (16)	11,0 (19)	over
SNS	negative	no	4,5 (0)	8,6 (15)	over
LSNS	negative	yes	1,6 (0)	8,0 (14)	over
We Are Family	negative	no	-	6,6 (11)	over
Most-Híd	mixed	mixed	6,9 (13)	6,5 (11)	under
Siet	negative/neutral	no	-	5,6 (10)	under
KDH	negative/neutral	no	8,8 (16)	4,9 (0)	under
SMK/MKP	negative	yes	4,3 (0)	4,0 (0)	under

III. MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION

Examining immigration practices of Western Europe, Hungary, and Israel

Sándor Szabó


This essay discusses different aspects of contemporary migration. While it endeavours to define key factors and notions of migration, including regular and irregular practices, the focus is set on its practical implementations with regards to labour migration and integration. It begins with a clear differentiation between migrants and refugees so as to properly operate with these terms throughout the text. The second part of the essay examines three distinctive case studies concerning migration and integration, namely Western European countries, Hungary, and Israel. The first case is an example for mass migration with challenged success, where integration has created societal and political problems. In the second case, the emphasis is put on Hungary, where immigration seems to be an economic necessity due to major labour shortages and mass emigration. Lastly, Israel is examined; a country which is built on immigration and has successfully privatized integration policies, thus creating a successful practice for integration. These three cases might seem different; however, the aim of the essay is compare integrational dynamics of various kinds. Western European countries have encouraged immigration on a wide scale, and have struggled with integration for decades. Israel could not exist without immigration, and as examined later on, has coped with managing even large influxes of migrants with relative success. Hungary on the other hand has not experienced intense immigration; on the contrary, the country has been burdened with mass emigration. By drawing conclusions, we can better understand migration processes, and infer to possible future integrational policies.

International Migration

Definitions

From prehistoric times, migration has been a characteristic feature of human nature; hence it has been influencing politics and international relations. (Koslowsky 2009) Although modern time migration was most dominant in the Americas, recent trends show that Asia is about to play a more dominant role in immigration, for instance in the Gulf States.⁴⁷ (Münz 2010). Europe traditionally was a place from where people emigrated. However, in the post-World War 2 era the trend altered and Western European countries started recruiting workforce from other countries. (Münz 2010, 144). Most recent numbers indicate that about 244 million people live outside their birth nations – this gives approximately 3% of the total world population.⁴⁸

International migrants in regions of destination by origin, 2000, 2015



47 See Appendix 1

48 However, this is just a close approximation, since many countries lack accurate population registers.

Legal migration comprises of labour, humanitarian, educational, and social aspects. The first one can be temporary or permanent (Tanaka 2008, 5), and the control over the influx of migrants can be demand driven, employer led, or government led [usually by the point system].⁴⁹ The humanitarian aspect refers to refugees and asylum seekers, fleeing from life threatening circumstances. According to UNHCR there are 14 million refugees worldwide, which gives only about 5% of the whole number of migrants [244 million people not living in their country of birth]. The third aspect is about international students, scholars arriving to another country for academic purposes. The last one is the social factor, which includes family reunifications. (Tanaka et al. 2008, 5-8, Münz 2010, Münz 2016) These four are the regular types of migration; however, irregular migration has also played a dominant role in contemporary migration dynamics.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, there is great equivocation – either deliberate or inconsiderate – by politicians, and the media. There is a major difference between humanitarian and labour migration. While the former is regulated by the 1951 Geneva Convention and UNHCR directives, the latter is under national control, and in most cases is controlled by market driven forces. Nevertheless, due to opportunistic political goals, populist parties have used these terms interchangeably, thus creating an atmosphere of uncertainty that can be used for fearmongering.

Irregular migration

The international community has been combatting with irregular migration,

49 Point system is a selection process through which a country can have firm, strategic control in a transparent and flexible manner. (Tanaka 2008, 11-2) Countries like Canada, United Kingdom, Australia use it.

50 According to Morehouse(2011) the term „irregular” is debated, and is utilized in different manners. For more, see: Morehouse,Christal and Michael Blomfield (2011) 'Irregular Migration in Europe'.

that is, illegal entry, human smuggling and trafficking. The major difference between smuggling and trafficking is that in the second case, after paying for the smugglers, individuals are forced into labour or prostitution. (Koslowsky 2008, 115) Another problematic issue is visa-overstaying which, according to a Pew research (2006), gave 40-50 % of all 12 million illegal immigrants in the United States in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This data is backed by the European Commission (2008), that is, every second person of the 8 million illegal immigrants in the EU is there because they overstayed their visas. Although visa-overstaying can be fought against on national levels unilaterally, the fight against international smuggling and trafficking entails tighter cooperation on a global level.

Regular migration

According to the United Nations' (UN) definition, international migration persists that after the change of domicile, a migrant spends more the twelve months in another country. This excludes tourists or seasonal visits of business people. (Münz 2010, 156.) A different approach, Koslowski (2011) examines not only international migration, but global mobility as a whole. He includes all the border crossings of any time, regardless of length or purpose. Applying his definition there are billions of border crossings annually.⁵¹

Table 1. International migrant stock (millions)

	1990	2000	2010	2013
World	154.2	174.5	220.7	231.5
Developed regions	82.3	103.4	129.7	135.6
Developing regions	71.9	71.1	91	95.9
Africa	15.6	15.6	17.1	18.6
Asia	49.9	50.4	67.8	70.8
Europe	49	56.2	69.2	72.4
Latin America and the Caribbean	7.1	6.5	8.1	8.5
Northern America	27.8	40.4	51.2	53.1
Oceania	4.7	5.4	7.3	7.9

Source: United Nations (2013), Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision.

51 Based on a 2008 UN estimate, there are around 1 billion border crossings every year for leisure and business purposes, which adds up to 2 billion crossings should all these travelers return home.

The author argues that with the development of transportation there are less and less economic and physical constraints that can act as obstacles for migration. (Koslowsky 2008, 103). These constraints are replaced by legal and political barriers, thus immigration is highly politicized and there is a growing tension between human rights and security. However, he also adds that much of the world's 7.4 billion people will never leave their country of birth. Consequently, that gives the major difference between the 244 million global migrants (UN definition of migration) and the international tourists (global mobility). The main difference is that the former arrive primarily from lower social classes and take jobs undesirable for the native population, while the latter comprises of middle or and upper class people (Koslowsky 2008, 114).

Table 2 - International Tourist Arrivals (in millions, ordered by 2006 ranking)

Rank		1995	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
	World	535.0	682.0	702.0	691.0	761.0	803.0	846.0
1	France	60.0	77.2	n/a	75.0	75.1	75.9	79.1
2	Spain	34.9	47.9	n/a	50.8	52.4	55.9	58.5
3	U.S.	43.5	51.2	43.6	41.2	46.1	49.2	51.1
4	China	20.0	31.2	36.8	33.0	41.8	46.8	49.6
5	Italy	31.1	41.2	n/a	39.6	37.1	36.5	41.1
6	U.K.	23.5	25.2	n/a	24.7	27.7	28.0	30.7
7	Germany	14.8	19.0	n/a	18.4	20.1	21.5	23.6
8	Mexico	20.2	20.6	19.7	18.7	20.6	21.9	21.4
9	Austria	17.2	18.0	n/a	19.1	19.4	20.0	20.3
10	Russia	n/a	n/a	n/a	20.4	19.9	19.9	20.2
	Turkey	7.1	9.6	n/a	13.3	16.8	20.3	n/a

Source: UNWTO 2005; 2006; 2007


Populist parties have been using the issue of security concerning migration, and have built their policies on fearmongering so as to gain power. An epitome is the United Kingdom. Populist and Eurosceptic political actors forced a referendum in 2016 about the UK's membership in the European Union. In their campaign much focus was set on the issue of migration, and politicians urged for stricter border management and scrutinized migration processes.

(CSJCC 2016). These populist forces can use fear successfully as the increased amount of migration does raise security issues (Koslowsky 2008, 103-5). Moreover, terrorist attacks made the European and American policy makers rethink their security policies. This resulted in higher and tighter coherence in international cooperation, and more and more UN member states have started to use visa and border control policies similar to the American one.

The European context


The European Union is not a single market – despite all former steps that proved to be insufficient – but twenty-eight national ones. (Münz 2014, 103). Mobility appears only in a restricted scale [approximately 8.1 million European citizens have changed domicile inside the European Union]. Reasons include major differences in education systems, national regulations, linguistic barriers, and welfare structures. Fertility rates are low, so immigration not only plays an important role in economic aspects, but it has a significant impact on demographic indicators. They contribute to human capital stocks, and help maintaining the social benefits. (OECD 2012)

Components of total population growth in OECD countries, 1960-2020, per thousand inhabitants



Source: OECD Population and Vital Statistics database.

Changes in the tertiary-educated labour force, 2000-10 by source



Sources: European countries: European Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat), 2000 and 2010; United States: 2000 Census and American Community Survey 2010; Canada: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 1998-2008.

43 Source article missing from bumm.sk, interpretation available at <http://felvidek.ma/2015/11/a-most-hid-kozep-es-del-szlovakiaba-telepitene-a-migransokat/>

Between 2000 and 2010 immigrants gave 70% of the increase in workforce in the European Union. However, only a small part of this increase belongs to labour migration, while family reunifications and free-movement migration⁵² contributed more dominantly. (OECD 2012). Immigrants' impact is enormous in rapidly growing sectors of the economy in OECD countries (migrants represented 15% of strongly developing economic sector entrants in Europe).

The 2012 OECD report also claims that migrants' tax contribution to the national budget is higher than the amount of money they receive as subsidies or other sort of social benefits. Moreover, 80% of the population growth is coming from migration in the European Union. Today the number of immigrants is higher in the EU than in the United States. (Münz, 2010, 160,164).

Europe is currently dependent on migration due to both economic and demographic factors. OECD went further, claiming that migration boosts technological progress, working-age population, and labour market flexibility. Nevertheless, GDP contribution gives only one side of the multifaceted nature of immigration, and many experts () argue, that integration also has to be taken into account.

The volume of immigration is overwhelming in some European countries. In the year 2006, first and second generation migrants gave 12.3 per cent of the population in Germany, 10.7 per cent in France, 9.1 percent in the United Kingdom and 8.5 per cent in Spain. (Münz 2006, Foner 2008). However, these numbers mean little without taking into consideration the effectiveness of integration. Studies suggest that in Germany 80% of Turks and ex-Yugoslav immigrants spoke German in 2005, and 80% of second generation

52 EU/EFTA migration, EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007.

Turkish immigrants stated that they intended to stay in Germany. Data from France indicates that the extent of education levels for second generation immigrants exceeds that of their parents. Surprisingly, in the United Kingdom many second generation immigrants have higher rates in tertiary education than native whites. (Foner 2008).

Concerning employment, data are less positive. Unemployment rate in France among immigrants with Arab origin is significantly higher than that of the native population. In many cases second generation immigrants work at workplaces that require lower skills and qualifications than their educational level. This also stands for Turks in Germany, and immigrants in the United Kingdom, including those arriving from European Union member states. (Münz 2006, Foner 2008).

In public and academic discourse many have articulated that one major challenge for successful integration of second generation immigrants is of religious origin, namely Islam. (Foner 2008). Muslims are the largest religious minority in Europe, giving approximately 15 million people of the total population with a high fertility rate. In Western Europe major groups are the Algerians and Moroccans in France, Turks in Germany, and Bangladeshi and Pakistani in the United Kingdom.


One of the possible reasons for the second generation immigrants to turn to Islam is to maintain or regain their dignity in a society they do not feel belonging to. In many cases they do not consider themselves as Moroccans, Turks, Germans or French, but Muslims as a whole. This indicates that they started to lose connection with their country of origin, but could not find new ties to the new society. Foner (2008) calls this “cultural isolation” which, when mixed with radical Islam teachings, can lead to violence and terrorism.

Hungary

Regular migration in Hungary


Concerning immigration Hungary is both a transit and destination country for regular and irregular migrants. As for statistics, the majority of immigrants have arrived from the European Union member states (68%). By 2011 28,641 people arrived from Romania, 8,744 from Slovakia, and 12,773 from Germany. Twenty-three per cent of all immigrants came from Asia (mainly from China), while 4% - arrived from America. According to the Central Statistical Office of Hungary 55% of immigrants are men, 46% of them are between 20-59 years of age [working population], and 45% settled down in Budapest, the capital city. There were 93,000 migrants in 2001, this number more than doubled by 2011, at the maximum rate of 206,000. (KSH, 2016). Bloomberg (2015) recently reported that 67.9% of migrants – who are mainly minority Hungarians from neighbouring nations – are employed; in contrast with Hungarian natives' 58.2% of employment. OECD reported that Hungary has highly successful tendencies in integration.

Hungary accepted the Hungarian Migration Strategy in 2013. (IOM 2016) It declares the protection of national labour market of utmost importance. However, it also admits that migration is a necessity; especially knowledge-based migration is to be promoted. Nevertheless, only 4700 people applied for work permits in 2014, mainly from Ukraine, China, Japan, and the United States. There is no real tendency for third country nationals to get EU Blue Cards in order to be employed in Hungary. (IOM 2016)



Hungary is in severe need of workers in specific economic sectors. A Manpower Group study reported in 2015 that more than a shocking 50% of Hungarian firms “have significant difficulties filling jobs” – especially in the IT, healthcare, and blue collar segments. (IOM, 2016). The influential newspaper The Economist referred in 2015 to the shortage in the Hungarian healthcare system, as 40% of Hungarian doctors were over 60 years old and two hundred medical practices were with no doctors at all. The population is aging rapidly, thus workforces are shrinking. It is due to declining birth rates, stretching lifespan, and the emigration of low-skilled and highly trained workers. Population is expected to decrease by 8% by 2035. (Economist 2015, IOM 2016). After the global financial crisis in 2008 a significant amount of vocational workers left the country. Significant shortage was reported by the representatives of the construction industry, too. (Portfolio.hu 2016). According to a Financial Observer report (2016), the administrative and service sectors are also lacking workers. As the Hungarian Academy of Sciences published in a recent study (2015) the lack of skilled employees have reached a level where it is a serious burden for economic expansion, many investments have not been carried out already, and the trend seems to continue in the ongoing years.

52 EU/EFTA migration, EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007.




1. Labour Shortage, as an obstacle for business expansion in construction industry (reported by companies in %)

The Economist report suggests (2015) that the Balkans' population could be a potential source for immigration in Hungary. However, nationalism, short-sightedness, protectionism, and low wages created an economic paradox, where real needs cannot be satisfied. So far it has been the Hungarian minority in the neighboring countries that could fill the employment gap created by the aging population and emigration. Tens of thousands of Hungarians arrived from Romania, Serbia and Ukraine. Their integration was relatively easy, since they spoke the native language; the majority of them followed the cultural, political dynamics of Hungary. Moreover, settling down in Hungary meant an improvement in their life conditions with higher wages, better infrastructure and free access to Hungarian education. However, these countries face similar economic and demographic problems as Hungary, and now many of those willing to emigrate leave for Western Europe, so as to earn four or five times higher wages. Filling shortages with Hungarian minorities seems an obvious solution; nevertheless it also means the further shrinking of the indigenous Hungarian population in the Carpathian Basin. According to another perception, Hungary should protect and support these communities in order to help them prosper locally.

According to Howard F. Chang (2007) from the Pennsylvania University, the impact of immigration on native workers is negative only in cases of the least skilled migrants. He adds, that protective labour regulations are expensive, and in many cases ineffective. Uri Dadush' paper (2014) from the Carnegie Institute supported Chang's thesis about the positive effects of low-skilled immigration. He claims that migrants open new demands, and enforce legal migration. He adds that host countries have to realize that they need migration and should modify their immigration policies accordingly. This is also part of the findings of a 2006 UN study, where the authors claim that low-skilled migration has positive effects on the receiving countries, while also being beneficial for sending states. (Katseli et al, 2006, 58-9).


However, there are various factors that prevent migration to Hungary. Firstly, the issue of low wages and over-taxed employment. Hungary has the 4th highest tax wedge among the 34 OECD member countries (OECD 2016), meaning that an average single worker faces 49% tax wedge, which is significantly higher than the 35.9% of the OECD average. Moreover, the overtaxed wages are extremely low, regardless of whether the minimum wages or the average wages are taken into account.

Secondly, due to the current political atmosphere migration is a highly politicized issue making it impossible to have an objective discourse about the issue at hand. Mihaly Varga, the Hungarian Finance Minister, announced that due to the severe shortages in workforce the Government is working on a new legislation that will allow the settlement of workers who are "able to integrate culturally". Thirdly, some opposition parties like LMP (Hungarian Green Party) have warned that the inflow of labour migrants can freeze low wages, and depress future prospects of Hungary catching up to the European wage averages. They suggest systematic tax reductions along with continuous raises so as to attract home Hungarian emigrants.




Irregular migration in Hungary

Due to dramatic increase in irregular transit migration there are stricter border management regulations, and tighter work policies for foreigners in Hungary. As a result of its geographical location, Hungary has been the subject of transit migration. However the impact of irregular entries increased enormously in 2015 as the country lies on the West- Balkan route.



It has the utmost priority for Hungary to combat irregular migration. On the one hand it is due to the fact that prior to the building of the border fence on the Serbian border in 2015, around 500,000 irregular border crossings were reported by authorities. This number was 50,000 in 2014, and it did not reach 10,000 in 2012. After the government erected the fence, backed with strict border management policies and the presence of the army, the numbers dropped significantly. On the other hand, it is a highly politicized issue in the domestic politics. Although half a million people entered the country, and around half of them applied for asylum, the vast majority of these people left Hungary within a few days, and continued their journey to Western Europe. Along with the construction of the fence, Hungary initiated amendments to the asylum law. This includes the recognition of Serbia as a safe third country, allowance of expedited asylum procedures, and making the damaging or climbing of the fence illegal punishable with imprisonment. (IOM 2016).



Israel

Brief historical overview

Since its modern history, immigration has played a significant role in Israel's history. Thousands of people arrived from all over the world to start a new life in the newly established country. This meant that people from various countries, social backgrounds, and cultural heritages had to settle down in a territory where, in many cases, basic infrastructure was missing as well as proper housing. That is why integration policies were dominant in the everyday political life, so as to create the new Israeli society. (Shpaizman, 2008). The large scale immigration was backed by the Israeli "Law of Return" act, which allowed everyone with Jewish ancestors to settle down in the country. The result is that approximately 70% of today's Israeli population are descendants of immigrants.

Since the early 1950s Israel had a descriptive immigration policy. The government provided all the necessary infrastructure and goods for the new arrivals; however, it also determined where the new-comers had to settle down. This of course was against the freedom of choice, but was a necessary step at the early stage of state foundation. It also contradicted the neo-liberal theory of the minimal-state. Therefore, in the early 1980s governmental agencies and theoreticians raised their voices for loosening the strict immigration settlement policies. However, from 1989 a new wave of mass immigration began in Israel. The reason for that was the collapse of the Soviet Union. It required the establishment of a new policy, which meant a significantly different approach. Instead of firmer state intervention, the Israeli government realized that immigration policies should be privatized. By the inclusion of private capital innovative dynamics could emerge and prevail in the immigration processes. (Shpaizman, 2008)

The government set up large absorption centres for the immigrants. There were several centres and the immigrants had the opportunity to decide in which region they would like to settle down. They still had to take mandatory language courses so as to better integrate into the society, nevertheless they had the freedom to choose its time and place according to their preferences. They could also decide when and where they intended to look for jobs, and this was mainly determined by the labour market forces, instead of state initiatives. This resulted in healthy, market-driven dynamics. Families were provided with 'absorption packages'; that is, they could choose between various sources of subsidies in accordance with their personal needs.

The majority of the immigrants arriving in the 1990s settled down according to the new privatized policy. Except for the Ethiopian minority, as in their case the government used the previous descriptive system from the 1950s. The necessity of using a different approach was not due to racial prejudice. The vast majority of the African arrivals were illiterate arriving from agrarian societies. The government believed that freedom of choice can only be based on careful deliberations of a well-informed public, the prerequisite of which is to be educated. Thus they employed the non-liberal policy. However, the emphasis was on the rapid integration of these groups via language courses and employment.

The state consciously withdrew from the immigration and integration services during the 1990s. Initially it started with the accommodation processes and later it included the social, welfare, employment, and even educational sectors. These responsibilities were transferred to NGOs and private actors. One of the prime examples was the employment service course system. The state distributed vouchers for the new-comers, so that they could participate in various employment trainings based on their interests and the labour mar-

ket tendencies. There were no state directives and it was up to the employees' needs to decide which profession to choose. It turned out to be a huge success, and by 2008 the voucher system gave more than 50% of all governmental immigration subsidies.

Relying on the private sector was a necessity originating from the huge number of immigrants, and the burden it meant for the state budget. The government could not have been able to deal with the immense number of people coming from post-soviet states. The inclusion of private capital meant only a supplementary aid for the budget, however; soon after it became the chief actor in immigration processes, and now provides the bulk of the total budget. This dominating liberal theory of the minimal state also supported the lower levels of state intervention. In recent years, numerous projects ceased to exist that were only financed by state funds, and were replaced by private funds. Moreover, local governments have been provided with more responsibilities in the decision making processes, meaning that less and less programs are determined by the central government. Local communities, authorities and experts can participate and create directives at a local level.

It is still a state directive to minimize state-dependency. However, the system also has disadvantages. One instance surfaced in the early 1990s. The government delegated accommodation policies to the market forces, but the private construction sector could not keep up with the amount of immigrants. This resulted in severe housing shortages, extremely high renting expenses, societal unrest, and many asked for immediate state intervention. Therefore, the government had to give up its neutral stance, and vast state-financed constructions began. As soon as the impact of immigration started to decline the state started to withdraw accordingly, giving the arena to private investments again.

Immigration conditions and subsidies in Israel.

According to the State of Israel, the country propagates and welcomes immigration to the country. Anyone with at least one Jewish grandparent is entitled to settle down in Israel as well as to get the Israeli citizenship in accordance with the 1950 Law of Return. The applicant should be able to provide necessary documentation to prove Jewish ancestry, and these documents should be authorized by the Israeli Interior Ministry, thus giving permission to settle down. After this, immigrants are allowed to select the new place of accommodation in Israel, where they are provided with free of charge language courses for five months, financial state subsidies for six months, affordable housing for five months, free of charge flight tickets to arrive to Israel, free of charge social and healthcare insurance for six months, free tertiary education, and several minor benefits (Moia.gov 2016).

Integration and the Ruppin Index

The Ruppin index is a tool that was constructed to be able to follow the integration of seven groups on a yearly basis in Israel. According to Amit and Semyonov (2006) there have been several major waves of immigration to the Jewish country. Firstly, prior to the establishment of the country in 1948. Secondly, the first significant inflow from 1948 to 1952, that was followed by a sporadic immigration period between 1953 and 1989. Israel had to cope with the next mass immigration after the collapse of the USSR (1989-1998), when there was another simultaneous influx from Ethiopia during the 1980s and 1990s. In the early 2000s immigrants arrived from Western states, mainly from North America and France.

The Ruppin index follows the integration processes of these immigrant groups, along with the native population, namely a) Immigrants from Com-


monwealth of Independent States (former USSR), b) Ethiopian immigrants, c) veteran immigrants, d) all other immigrants after 1989, e) second generation Mizrahim, f) second generation Ashkenazim, g) Arab citizens of Israel. (Ruppin Index 2010). The index measures several aspects of integration that are social integration, standard of living, occupational integration, and general satisfaction of immigrants in the new society.

Table 3: Percentages reporting that they have good command of the language³

Survey year	2003	2008
Level of Hebrew Language	%	%
Immigrants from former USSR	12	22
Immigrants from Ethiopia	28	41
Immigrants after 1989	22	30
Veteran immigrants	66	72
Second generation Mizrahim	82	87
Second generation Ashkenazim	92	93
Israeli Arabs	36	29
Total	60	62

1. figure source: Semyonov, Moshe et al (2010) Ruppin Index. Annual Index for Immigrant Integration in Israel

The Ruppin study (2010) compared data from 2003 and 2008, and examined the differences in these indicators. Their results show improvement in all groups of immigrants, except for the Arab minority where a significant decrease can be seen (36%-29%).



2. figure Source: Semyonov, Moshe et al (2010) Ruppin Index. Annual Index for Immi


Table 10: Standard of Living Dimension: Standardized Scores Compared to the Average and Compared to the Second Generation Ashkenazim Group

Survey Year	2003		2005		2008	
Dimension for Level and Quality of Living	Relative to average	Relative to 2 nd gen Ashkenazim	Relative to average	Relative to 2 nd gen Ashkenazim	Relative to average	Relative to 2 nd gen Ashkenazim
Immigrants from former USSR	-1.12	-3.01	-0.58	-2.14	-0.84	-2.48
Immigrants from Ethiopia	-2.92	-4.80	-2.66	-4.22	-2.45	-4.09
Immigrants after 1989	0.01	-1.87	-0.74	-2.29	0.53	-1.12
Veteran immigrants	0.41	-1.48	0.60	-0.96	0.57	-1.07
Second generation Mizrahim	-0.29	-2.17	-0.02	-1.57	0.04	-1.61
Second generation Ashkenazim	1.88	0.00	1.55	0.00	1.65	0.00
Israeli Arabs	-1.68	-3.57	-1.89	-3.44	-2.15	-3.80

3. figure Source: Semyonov, Moshe et al (2010) Ruppin Index. Annual Index for Immi

As for the standard of living, the basis of comparison was the group of second generation Ashkenazim. The study found that all groups of immigrants had better conditions, except for the veterans and the Arab population (in the latter case their standards of living worsened by 3%). The greatest improvement occurred in the wage-gap between the former USSR immigrants and

the second generation Ashkenazim (by 26% in the examined period). However, poverty is 40% higher among immigrants, and overall there is a 20% gap between net incomes. Modest improvement was revealed with regards to employment income in all immigrant groups, again with the exception for the Arab population.



4. figure Source: Semyonov, Moshe et al (2010) Ruppin Index. Annual Index for Imm

These indicators are reflected in the overall satisfaction charts. As of 2003 65% of the total population reported that they were satisfied with their lives. By 2008 this number rose up to 73%. Interestingly, the satisfaction index of Israeli Arabs came near to the general average (73% - 83%, with the general average at 85%). According to the Ruppin study the Israeli government has attempted to increase the number of Arab employees in the civil service, such as in ministries, educational facilities, and the financial sector. Nevertheless, the number of Arab employees is still around 8% of civil sector workers, and they are mainly occupied in positions where they have to deal with Arab customers, for instance at local Arab offices. This indicates that there is still much to do with integration. The government launched a five-year initia-

tive in which they plan to improve infrastructural, educational, and housing conditions of the Arab communities in municipalities. This expresses that state-intervention is still needed in Israel.

Conclusion

Immigration and integration plays a dominant part in contemporary politics, and policy makers utilize various practices that, in many cases, vary significantly. Western European countries have been coping with integrating their populous immigrant communities, while still in need for further arrivals due to economic and demographic reasons. As for Israel, the country has been built on mass immigration, and, according to the Ruppin Index managed to handle the situation. Nevertheless, the Jewish State still has to cope with the worsening conditions of the Arab community, and has much to do with their total integration to the society.


Hungary is in severe need for highly skilled and blue collar work force, however; due to the particularistic political atmosphere, the country has failed to establish and implement successful immigration policies, thus it faces further economic backlashes. Studies and reports claim that regular migration has numerous positive effects on national economies in OECD countries. Other works also indicated that only the least-skilled migrants cannot contribute to national economies efficiently. Hungary is in an urgent need for migration, both in low-skilled (for construction industry and other blue collar sectors) and high-skilled segments of the economy. National solutions, restrictions are not only expensive, but they hinder economic development, and cannot contribute to resolving demographic challenges. Economic indicators reveal that labour migration – even low-skilled influx – does not enhance unemployment and depress wages. On the contrary, it boosts the economy, en-

courages technological advancement. However, countries have to consider improving their selection procedures, in order to better control migration inflow. Further research could examine whether Hungary should apply the point system, or other methods are favourable. One factor is certain; the country has to open its labour market in order to provide economic and demographic opportunities.

Appendix

Annex 1

Map 1. Change in the international migrant stock, 2000-2013 (percentages)



Source: United Nations (2013), *Trends in International Migrant Stock: the 2013 Revision*.

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THE HUNGARIAN QUOTA REFERENDUM

Andrea Virág – Dániel Mikecz

The referendum regarding EU refugee quotas held on October 2 ended with an invalid result, since 41 percent of the voters cast a valid vote. "No" ballots compiled the large majority of the valid votes with 98 percent voting "no" and 2 percent voting "yes".

The ratio of the valid, and above this the "no" votes is directly related to popularity of Fidesz – in counties where the party performed well during the 2014 parliamentary elections the ratio of valid ballots was high compared to the national norm; whereas in counties where Fidesz's 2014 performance was poor, the number of valid votes in the referendum was significantly lower. Instead of community size and aggregated popularity of Fidesz and Jobbik, Fidesz's popularity proved to be in the greatest correlation with valid "no" votes. Regional tendency of invalid ballots shows a pattern similar to the popularity of SZDSZ and Együtt observed during the 2006 parliamentary and the 2014 European parliamentary elections respectively. This indicates the invalid voting being a particular left-wing, liberal reaction to the referendum.


The results of Republikon Institute's quiz reveal that while non-attendance and invalid ballots were mainly fuelled by political aims, voting „yes" had content related aims as motivation. The mentality of those voting "no" reflects the government campaign's system of reasoning.

All of the above meaning that voting was about refugees and the quota for those voting "no", and about the judgement of the Orbán-government for those not attending or casting an invalid ballot.

Results


The referendum regarding EU refugee quotas held on October 2nd ended with an invalid result as 41 percent of the voters cast a valid vote – this does not reach the 50 percent threshold necessary for validity. The overwhelming majority of the valid ballots were “no” votes – 98 percent voted “no” and only 2 percent “yes”. Such prevalence of “no” votes is a success for the governing party in any case; yet low attendance rates and the relatively high number of invalid votes are worth considering during the analysis of the results as an undoubtedly novel phenomena in Hungarian politics. The research material will firstly provide an introduction of connections regarding the referendum results, then the insights gained from the quiz authored by Republikon Institute, based on which one may gain a picture of the voters’ motivations on 2 October.

The question of the referendum’s validity has already arisen well before the referendum’s actual day, as, contrary to the result – of which polls had given quite a clean-cut impression – nothing sure could be safely said about validity. Thus, one of the main questions regarding the referendum was precisely whether it will be valid or not. Mobilization for the government, and campaign for invalid voting and non-attendance for most parties of the left-wing, liberal opposition became crucial objectives. Accordingly, invalidity became one of the central motives of interpreting results. Based on participation data available from previous elections Republikon Institute calculated a rate which demonstrates participation in counties respectively in proportion to national participation. The above mentioned rate shows for instance that 112 percent of the national participation is characteristic in Budapest. With the help of the ratios and considering the 44 percent national participation, we examined the prospective participation rates in the counties, comparing these anticipated results with the actual participation data.




As it is clearly visible from the figure, the actual participation rate fell behind the anticipated rate the most - based on previous elections- in Budapest. According to our calculations, in the capital city 49 percent turnout was expected which is 10 percentage points higher than the actual 39 percent attendance. Based on the anticipated rate, participation was lower than expected in Baranya, Pest, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Komárom-Esztergom and in Hajdú-Bihar counties, too. Participation was higher, however, in Western counties across the border, namely in: Győr-Moson-Sopron, Vas and Zala counties, where turnout was 3-4 percent higher than expected.

Within the framework of our analysis we also examined the connection between activity perceived at the referendum and popularity of Fidesz. In this case, Fidesz's 2014 parliamentary election results served as our starting point. The below figure shows the relation between Fidesz's popularity and the number of valid votes in each county.



It is clearly visible that in counties where Fidesz was strong in 2014 – for instance Győr-Moson-Sopron or Vas county – the number of valid votes in the referendum about the quota was also high, as well as the ratio of “no” votes. In Budapest, where Fidesz’s 2014 performance was relatively weaker compared to the national average, the ratio of valid ballots cast at the referendum was also low – lower by 19 percentage points than in Vas county which proved to be the most active.

On the next figure, the relation between Fidesz’s strength and the valid votes is even more obvious.




The figure shows Fidesz's performance compared to itself (meaning that national results equal 100 percent) in the individual counties, as well as the ratio of valid votes (in which case the national rate of valid votes is equals 100 percent). Therefore it is clearly visible that the ratio of valid votes is in strong relation with Fidesz's popularity – where Fidesz was strong in 2014, the number of valid votes was high, where the governing party performed poorer during the previous election the ratio of valid ballots cast at the referendum was also lower. This indicates that active participation at the referendum did not depend mainly on community type or joint popularity of Fidesz and Jobbik, but on Fidesz's popularity.


Invalid votes

It was during the current referendum that invalid votes became the focus of serious attention for the first time since the change of regime, therefore it is well worth to examine the turnout of these votes as well. Casting an invalid ballot became a real alternative as a result of the campaign of Magyar Kétfarkú Kutypárt and civil NGOs and in the end more than 6 percent of the votes was invalid.

The pattern of those casting an invalid ballot at the referendum regarding the quota shows a peculiar tendency, however: it is reminiscent of the support of earlier, smaller left-wing liberal parties. This is shown by the figure below where current invalid votes are compared by county with the ratio of those who voted for SZDSZ in the first turn of the elections in 2006. SZDSZ's 2006 result of 6,5 percent is actually the same as the ratio of the current invalid votes.




The results show that in several counties the two ratios are actually the same. Amongst voters in the capital both of the ratios mentioned are around 12 percent, as visible on the figure above. The same tendency emerges if the 2014 European Parliamentary election results of Együtt are compared with the referendum's invalid votes.



Naturally, the above does not necessarily mean that liberal voters in the past have cast invalid ballots – no such conclusion may be drawn from regional level data. What is revealed, however, is that there is a regional continuity in this sense as well as the fact that invalid voting is not a general expression of an anti-political or anti-Fidesz attitude, rather an explicit answer from the left-wing liberal, urbane political community which supported parties similar to SZDSZ or Együtt earlier.

In case of the "yes" votes – the countrywide rate of which was 1,7 percent – it is worth remembering that only the Liberális Párt encouraged it's voters to vote with "yes" and it's support is around 1 percent amongst the whole of the population. If we examine data by county, it is visible that the spreading of the ratio of "yes" votes is comparatively low, meaning that there is no county with this ratio being significantly higher or lower than the national result. Consequently, one would be hard-pressed to find any general tendency in how the "yes" votes played out; it is important to notice, however, that Budapest

moved further up from the national average. 2,1 percent of the voters casting valid ballots in the capital voted "yes". In Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county, the ratio of "yes" votes may be considered higher, as well (1,9 percent). The rate of people voting "yes" was the lowest in Győr-Moson-Sopron and Hajdú-Bihar counties, constituting only 1,4 percent of the valid votes. The rate of "yes" votes was reciprocally proportional to attendance; the lowest the attendance, the higher was the number of "yes" votes proportionally.



Voters' motivation

Republikon Institute compiled a quiz at the beginning of September, which made it possible for those completing it to test potential voting options for October 2 referendum. The quiz could be completed online in September; consequently, results are not representative regarding the voters of the country. Despite this, analysing the data provides a possibility to reveal the patterns of thinking, attitudes and motivations of voters; and is also able to give



insight regarding the differences amongst the motivations of the people casting an invalid ballot, voting "yes", boycotting the vote or voting "no".

Analysis of the results revealed that discontent with the posed question, and rejection of the general theme and stake of the referendum constituted the greatest motivation for casting an invalid ballot. The above is best represented by the fact that 95 percent of those completing the quiz and receiving "invalid" as their result believe that the question posed by the referendum is nonsensical; yet, they can still indicate their interest in public affairs by casting an invalid ballot. Most of those with the result "not attending" are of the same opinion; at the same time, the opportunity to demonstrate by not participating that the government's excluding, hate-mongering agenda does not affect citizens is significantly more important for this second group. Therefore, it is clearly visible that both those receiving "invalid" as their result, and those receiving "boycott" wanted to show their rejection towards the referendum and the government, they only deemed different routes as the most expedient. Another important difference between the two groups is the fact that the campaign message of there being several more pressing concerns than the refugee question – health care or education, for instance – is more prominently present in the outlook of boycotters.


While the two groups mentioned previously were largely motivated by certain political aims – through their behavior they wanted to declare their opposition against the government – , those receiving "yes" vote as their result were led by content related objectives. This is evident from the fact that almost three quarters of the people voting with yes maintains all countries – each according to its capacity - should be solidary and accept refugees; on the other hand, people agreeing with the above are regulary in the minority among those boycotting the referendum or voting with no. It is important to

mention that it is mainly the "yes" voters who believe in the quota being a possible successful solution.

Those who received a "no" vote as a result in the quiz hold different beliefs regarding almost every topic and their motivations strongly mirror the leading arguments of the government.



To summarize the above, it may be said that, according to the people voting „no” the referendum was about the refugees. On the other hand, according to those casting an invalid ballot or staying home, it was about the government. Invalidly voting participants thought the question ill-posed, while non-attending voters believe that the country should be concerned with other, more pressing matters.



Appendix: The quiz

1. **What is the October 2 referendum really about?**
 - a. The Orbán government.
 - b. Obligatory resettlement and Hungary's sovereignty.
 - c. The situation of Hungary within Europe and European solidarity.
 - d. A nonsensical and irrelevant question.

2. **How important is it for you to exercise your right to vote at every given opportunity?**
 - a. Participation in a voting is important even if one understands they are representing a minority opinion.
 - b. It is very important as only the identical opinion of the majority may authorize representatives of a political view.
 - c. Attendance is important even if the question is impossible to answer sensibly.
 - d. There are cases when it is unnecessary to attend a voting.

3. **Introduction of the obligatory refugee quota is...**
 - a. ...one of the possible good solutions.
 - b. ...a realistic threat to Hungary.
 - c. ...is not on the agenda thus the question is irrelevant and superfluous.
 - d. ...is a lot less pressing matter than several other important questions – health care, education – of which the government is trying to avert attention.

4. **The cause for the greatest concern regarding the referendum is that...**
 - a. substantive counter-opinion will be lacking and the government will have the chance to communicate the country standing united in this regard
 - b. those opposing the government will stay home or otherwise promote validity
 - c. we cannot prevent obligatory resettlement
 - d. referendum results will be falsified.

5. **By boycotting the referendum...**
 - a. we lose the opportunity to show a European alternative in the face of the government's campaign.
 - b. one only demonstrates that Hungary's future is inconsequential for them.
 - c. it can be shown that the excluding and hate-mongering agenda of the government is not an option for the sane majority.
 - d. one cannot send a message to the government nor to Europe as the opponents of the government and the passive voters cannot be differentiated from each other.

6. **The quota referendum...**
 - a. ...has only one thing at stake: to reveal who the real supporters of Europe are.
 - b. ...has serious stakes: a valid referendum may put Hungary at the EU's periphery and lead to loss of EU resources.
 - c. ...has serious stakes: we decide about Hungary's sovereignty and about immigration.
 - d. ...posed a nonsensical question to which no intelligent answer may be given. At the same time, we must make it clear that we are interested in public matters.

7. **What do you think the solution to the refugee crisis in Europe is?**
- a. The refugee crisis and immigration are far from being the most important matters in Hungary today; there are several more pressing concerns the addressing of which should come first.
 - b. It should be every country's own competence to deal with the refugee crisis; it is part of Hungary's sovereignty that it cannot be forced to accept refugees.
 - c. All countries – in accordance with their population and economical development – should show solidarity and accept a certain number of asylum seekers; and the above may be ensured by a centrally defined, proportional quota system among other things.
 - d. Both the government's and the European Union's solutions are faulty and the referendum won't take us closer to the right solution, either.

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